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Chapter 3: Public sector industrial relations in transition
The economic environment of recent years has had a transformatory effect 
on public sector industrial relations, with the crisis serving to accelerate and 
deepen changes that were already in train. The effects of this include a revival 
of unilateralism in the public sector, a recentralisation of wage-setting systems, 
an acceleration of the introduction of private sector-style HRM practices, and a 
general weakening of trade union influence over governments struggling to adapt 
to tough economic conditions.
Based on a draft by Lorenzo Bordogna, University of Milan and Roberto Pedersini, 
University of Milan.
3.1. Introduction
In most EU Member States govern-
ment responses to the economic and 
sovereign debt crises, which had their 
origins in 2007–2008, have severely hit 
the public sector. Traditional patterns 
of employment relations have been 
challenged, past trends in employment 
levels have been reversed, and public 
sector wages and pension systems have 
been cut and reformed in order to curb 
overall public sector pay-bill and reduce 
public debt.
This chapter provides an overview of the 
structure of the public sector, employ-
ment trends and the basic features of 
public sector employment relations in 
the EU-27, highlighting transformations 
in collective bargaining and wage-set-
ting systems.
The chapter is organised as follows.
Section 2 deals with the size of the 
public sector. Section 3 is devoted to 
the analysis of some structural fea-
tures of public sector employees, in 
terms of gender, part time/full time, 
temporary/open-ended employment 
and age. Section 4 analyses the employ-
ment status of public sector employees 
across the EU countries, with a distinc-
tion between those whose employment 
relationship is (still) regulated through a 
special statute, often under public and/
or administrative law, and those with 
ordinary employment contracts under 
civil or commercial law, like their private 
sector counterparts. The right to collec-
tive bargaining of public employees and 
possibly also the right to strike is linked 
to this distinction. Section 5 deals with 
trade unions and employers, with sub-
sections devoted to trade union density 
and structure, employers’ representa-
tives, and the European sectoral social 
dialogue. The wage-setting systems 
prevailing in EU Member States are the 
topic of Section 6, the main distinction 
being made between systems based on 
unilateral government determination, 
systems where collective bargaining 
is the main method of wage determi-
nation, and hybrid or mixed systems. 
This is linked to the traditional issue of 
centralisation/decentralisation of indus-
trial relations, as well as recent trends 
towards the differentiation and, possibly 
individualisation, of treatment which is 
addressed in Section 7. Section 8 deals 
with the issue of industrial conflict in 
the public services and the settlement 
of disputes. In the final Section, build-
ing on previous analyses, five country 
clusters are identified, summarising the 
main features that characterise pub-
lic sector industrial relations systems 
across the EU-27.
3.2. Size of the public 
sector
For an overview of the issues surround-
ing the definition of the public sector, see 
chapter 1. In particular, Box 1.3 explains 
that data based on a classification of 
activities can only serve as a proxy and 
not an exact measurement of the public 
sector. Based on this, in this chapter we 
use sections O, P and Q of the Statistical 
classification of economic activities of 
the European Community NACE Rev.2, 
from 2008 onwards  (1). These sections 
include respectively: public administration 
and defence, compulsory social security; 
education; human health and social work 
activities  (2). The share of total employ-
ment of employees in these activities in 
2008 and 2011 for the EU-27 countries 
plus Norway is reported in Appendix 3.1, 
while Table 3.1 below, first column, 
reports the share of all public sector 
activities (O+P+Q) of total employment 
as an average during 2008–2011.
Great variation across countries in the rel-
ative size of public sector employment is 
immediately apparent. Overall, four groups 
of countries can be identified (Table 3.2). 
At the two extreme poles are those with a 
very large public sector, with an employ-
ment share above 29 % of total employ-
ment, and those with a much smaller 
public sector, with an employment share 
below 20 %. The first group includes, in 
decreasing order, three out of four of the 
Nordic countries— Norway, Denmark, and 
(1)  A similar choice is made in Vaughan-Whitehead 
2012, ch. 1, while in Glassner 2010 only 
section O (Public administration and Defence; 
Compulsory social security) is considered.
(2)  In detail:  
Section O – PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND 
DEFENCE; COMPULSORY SOCIAL SECURITY  
84.1: Administration of the State and 
the economic and social policy of the 
community;  
84.2: Provision of services to the community 
as a whole (Foreign affairs; Defence 
activities; Justice and judicial activities; 
Public order and safety activities; Fire service 
activities);  
84.3: Compulsory social security activities;  
Section P – EDUCATION  
85.1: Pre-primary education  
85.2: Primary education  
85.3: Secondary education  
85.4: Higher education  
85.5: Other education  
85.6: Educational support activities  
Section Q – HUMAN HEALTH AND SOCIAL 
WORK ACTIVITIES  
86.1: Hospital activities  
86.2: Medical and dental practice activities  
86.9: Other human health activities  
87.1: Residential nursing care activities  
87.2: Residential care activities for mental 
retardation, mental health and substance abuse 
87.3: Residential care activities for the elderly 
and disabled  
87.9: Other residential care activities  
88.1: Social work activities without 
accommodation for the elderly and disabled  
88.9: Other social work activities without 
accommodation
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Sweden— in connection with the traditional 
large extension of the welfare state, imme-
diately followed by Belgium, Luxembourg, 
France, the UK, and the Netherlands. The 
opposite group comprises five of the 
former communist, eastern European 
countries, including Poland, Slovenia, the 
Czech Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania, 
plus Cyprus.
Table 3.1 Share of public sector employment in relation to total employment: comparison 
between different sources
1
LFS-Eurostat
2008–2011 average
(O+P+Q)
2
OECD
General Govern.
2008 a, b
3
OECD
General Gov. + Public 
Corporations
2008 a, b
4
EIRO
2004 or 2005
EU-27 24.4
EU-15 25.8
EU-12 25.7
NO 34.7 29.6 34.5 33.9
DK 32.6 28.7 31.5 30.4
SE 32.1 26.2
BE 31.5 17.1 24.9
LU 29.8 17.6 17.6 10
FR 29.7 21.9 24.4 20.3
UK 29.7 17.4 18.6 20.2
NL 29.5 12.6 21.4 11.5
FI 27.2 22.9 22.9 27.5
MT 25.4 32.1
DE 25.1 9.6 13.6 12
IE 25.1 14.8 16.7 17.9
LT 23.1 27.6
HU 22.6 19.5 19.5 20.8
AT 22.2 11.4 10.7
EE 21.7 18.7 22.3
LV 21.4 34.7
EL 21.2 7.9 20.7 22.1
SK 21.1 10.7 19.3 22.5
ES 20.5 12.3 13.0 15.2
PT 20.4 12.1 15
IT 20.2 14.3 14.3 14.5
PL 19.8 9.7 21.4 26.2
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1
LFS-Eurostat
2008–2011 average
(O+P+Q)
2
OECD
General Govern.
2008 a, b
3
OECD
General Gov. + Public 
Corporations
2008 a, b
4
EIRO
2004 or 2005
SI 19.6 14.7 22.6 23.2
CZ 19.1 12.8 19.4 14.7
CY 18.8 17.3
BG 18.5 26.2
RO 13.6 10.4
Also see Chapter 1 and Box 1.3 for a discussion of the definition, size and statistical classification of the public sector and public services.  
See appendix 3.2 and Chapter 4 (Table 4.6) for a discussion of the change in public sector employment.
Sources: 1) Eurostat LFS 2008-09-10-11, sections: O. P. Q; 2 and 3) OECD, Government at a Glance 2011, Fig. 21.1 and 21.2, based on 
ILO, LABORSTA database; 4) EIRO: Bordogna 2007.
NB: a) France and Portugal: 2006; b) Austria, Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Poland: data are expressed in full-
time equivalents.
Of the remaining countries, four— 
Finland, Malta, Germany, and Ireland— 
are closer to the group with the largest 
public sector, with an employment share 
around 25–27 %, while 10 are closer to 
the lowest pole, with an employment 
share between 20 and 24 %, includ-
ing Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Portugal, 
and Italy; only one case within the latter 
group, Lithuania, is slightly over 23 %.
A simplified scheme would stress a divide 
between a group consisting of all the cen-
tral and northern European countries of the 
former EU-15, with the exclusion of Austria 
and the inclusion of Malta, characterised by 
a relatively large public sector in terms of 
employment share, and a group of all the 
southern and eastern European countries, 
which have a lighter public sector.
It should be noted that the hierarchy 
would change significantly if only public 
administration and compulsory social 
security are considered. In this case all the 
Nordic countries (DK, NO, SE, FI) would be 
situated in the lowest part of the ranking, 
along with Ireland, Romania, and 
Lithuania, with up to 6 % of total employ-
ment, while at the top, with 8 % or over, 
we would find Luxembourg, France, 
Belgium, Malta and Greece, the remaining 
ones being in between.
However, as specified in Chapter 1, while 
the activities included in section O should 
certainly belong to the public sector, with 
few exceptions and uncertainties, sec-
tions P and Q include also private sector 
providers, to an extent that might signifi-
cantly vary across countries, and there is 
little scope for controlling for this feature 
(see Box 1.1 in Chapter 1).
Table 3.2 Public sector employment share of total 
employment, average 2008/2011
Public sector share on total 
employment
Countries
Over 29 %
Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France, UK, Netherlands. 
25 % — 29 % Finland, Malta, Germany, Ireland.
20 % — 24 %
Lithuania, Hungary, Austria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Greece, Slovakia, Spain, Portugal, Italy.
Below 20 %
Poland, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, 
Bulgaria, Romania.
The grouping of countries is based on 5 percentage-point intervals of public sector 
employment share as shown in Table 3.1, column 1.
Source: LFS Eurostat. NACE Rev.2. Sections O, P, Q.
To partly remedy these inaccuracies due 
to the unavailability of more focused 
data, the three remaining columns in 
Table 3.1 report data coming from dif-
ferent sources: the OECD Government at 
a Glance 2011, related to employment 
in General Government and in General 
Government plus Public Corporations, 
and a comparative study on public sec-
tor industrial relations for the European 
Foundation of Living and Working 
Conditions (Bordogna 2007). In two 
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cases the data of the three sources 
overlap almost perfectly: Norway 
and Denmark, at the top of the rank-
ing, with a public sector employment 
share always around or above 30 %. In 
another group of countries the avail-
able sources are also quite convergent, 
including Hungary, Estonia, Portugal, 
Cyprus, Romania, and, if public corpo-
rations are also included in the OECD 
data, Slovakia, Greece, Slovenia, and 
the Czech Republic. However, for the 
remaining countries there are sig-
nificant differences between the 
three (or two) sources. Among these, 
particularly remarkable are the dis-
crepancies regarding Belgium, the 
Netherlands, France, Luxembourg, 
the UK, Ireland, Italy, Spain, and 
Germany. Most notable is probably 
the case of Germany, which in both 
the OECD and EIRO ranking has one 
of the leanest public sectors in the EU, 
half or even less than in the Eurostat 
source. This feature has been con-
firmed by national case studies (Keller 
2011; also Holm-Hadulla et al. 2010). 
Similar discrepancies are confirmed 
by case studies regarding France, Italy 
and the UK (Bordogna and Neri 2011; 
Bach and Givan 2011).
The relative size of public sector employ-
ment aside, in about half of the coun-
tries the number of public employees 
has decreased since 2008 in the public 
administration, defence and social secu-
rity sub-sector. The decrease is particu-
larly notable in Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus, 
the UK, Denmark, and Portugal, at more 
than 8 %. These countries are followed 
by Belgium, France, Greece, Bulgaria, 
and the Netherlands, with a decrease 
between 3 and 7 %. However, in the 
education and health and social work 
activities, the number of employees 
has increased in many cases, so that, 
overall, only seven countries registered 
in 2011 a reduction in aggregate pub-
lic sector employment levels compared 
to 2008, namely Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, 
and, to a very limited extent, Italy and 
France. Only in two countries, Cyprus 
and Luxembourg, was the public sec-
tor employment share in 2011 (slightly) 
lower than in 2008. In France and Italy 
the share remained unchanged, while 
in all the other countries it was higher, 
to a varying degree, which might also 
be due to the fact that job losses have 
affected the private sector in par-
ticular (for details, see Appendix 3.2; 
see also Glassner 2010: 8). Arguably the 
main effects on employment levels, and 
possibly on employment share, of the 
austerity programs that many countries 
have recently adopted will be felt in the 
years to come (see Chapter 4).
3.3. Employment 
structure
A number of features traditionally 
characterise public sector employment 
in comparison with the entire economy: 
a higher female employment share, a 
greater proportion of part-time work, 
more widespread use of temporary 
employment and a relatively older 
workforce. Further, the proportion of 
employees with tertiary education is 
relatively higher in the public sector 
(for similar considerations, Giordano 
et al. 2011: 14–5).
Female employment. The participation 
of women in public sector employment 
is much higher than in the entire econ-
omy: in all countries the public sector 
female employment share is at least 
10 percentage points higher than in 
the entire economy, and in many cases 
more than 20 percentage points higher. 
While in the economy as a whole female 
employees always represent less than 
50 % of total employment, with the 
notable exceptions of the three Baltic 
countries, the percentage of women in 
the total public sector is always sig-
nificantly higher than 60 %, with the 
exception of Greece, Luxembourg, and 
Malta. In the three Baltic countries, the 
four Nordic countries, the UK, Ireland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia the figure is over 
70 % (Table 3.3).
There is, however, wide variation between 
the three subsectors of the public sec-
tor. In public administration, defence and 
social security, the percentage of female 
employees is in most countries is close to 
that of the entire economy, and in sev-
eral cases even lower. This is due to the 
significant presence of some functions 
and roles that are traditionally exercised 
by men and where women are usually 
still a minority— not only police, armed 
forces and defence in general, but also 
prison guards, diplomatic services, and in 
some countries, the judiciary. By contrast, 
education, health and social work activi-
ties are characterised by occupations 
with a very high female density— teach-
ers, social workers, nurses, and increas-
ingly medical doctors. In such sectors 
women are in all countries the absolute 
majority. In education, female employees 
(mostly teachers) always represent at 
least two thirds of the entire workforce, 
with the exception of Finland, Malta, 
Spain, Greece, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
and the Netherlands. This feature is even 
more marked in the health and social 
work sector, where in 14 countries more 
than four out of five employees are 
women. Further, in another nine coun-
tries women represent more than three 
out of four employees.
In some cases this is linked to employ-
ment and welfare policies deliberately 
aimed at promoting female participation 
in the labour market, as is the case in 
the Nordic countries. Nevertheless, a very 
high female density can also be observed 
in the UK and in several Central and 
Eastern European countries, such as the 
three Baltic countries, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, and Poland.
In most of the Mediterranean countries— 
Greece, Italy, Cyprus and Malta— this 
tendency is less pronounced, although 
with differences between the education 
and the health and social work sector.
Part-time employment. A feature con-
nected with the high female share of 
public sector employment is the wide-
spread use of part-time work, although 
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with wide variations across countries 
and between the three subsectors 
(Table 3.4). Looking at the public sec-
tor as a whole, only in eight out of the 
23 countries that provide relevant data 
is the percentage of part-time work-
ers lower than in the entire economy, 
including five Mediterranean countries 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy, Malta and Greece), 
two Eastern European countries (Poland 
and Slovenia), and Finland, which, with 
its modest 14 %, is a peculiarity for a 
Nordic country. In all the remaining cases 
part-time work is more widespread than 
in the entire economy, and in some coun-
tries markedly more so. At the top of this 
ranking we find the Netherlands, with an 
astonishing 64 % of part-timers. But also 
in many central and northern European 
countries at least one out of three public 
sector employees has a part-time job, 
including Norway, Sweden, Belgium, 
Germany, the UK, and, at a little dis-
tance, Austria and Denmark. A compara-
tive assessment of the weight of public 
sector employment on total employment 
should therefore take into consideration 
these differences.
Variations across subsectors are also 
very relevant. The incidence of part-
timers is predictably lower in the pub-
lic administration, defence and social 
security sector, given the roles and 
occupations prevailing in these activi-
ties. In effect, in all the countries that 
provide data, with the only exception of 
Slovakia and Hungary, the percentage 
of part-time work is systematically and 
notably smaller than in the public sector 
as a whole, in several cases even less 
than half (Norway, Finland, Denmark, 
Poland, Ireland, Spain, Greece, Czech 
Republic). Likewise predictable, for the 
same reasons, is the higher incidence 
of part-timers in the education, health 
and social work sectors, especially in 
the latter sector. A sort of polarisation 
between countries is, however, observ-
able. At one extreme, in a country like 
the Netherlands, these sectors appear 
to be the real reign of part-time work-
ers, as these employees represent by a 
large margin the absolute majority, with 
respectively six and almost eight units of 
personnel out of every 10. But, this out-
lier apart, in another group of countries 
the incidence of part-time work is also 
very significant, close to or above 30 % 
and 40 % of the workforce, respectively. 
This group contains all the Nordic coun-
tries (with the exception of Denmark and 
Finland) Germany, Austria, Belgium, and 
the UK. At the opposite pole, however, 
there are countries where the percentage 
of part-timers is surprisingly low even 
in these activities— it is below, and in 
some cases significantly below, 10 %. 
These countries are Greece, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, 
Slovenia and in part Latvia, Cyprus and 
the Czech Republic. The line of division is 
apparently between central and northern 
European countries on the one hand, and 
southern and eastern European countries 
on the other hand.
Part-time employment increased 
between 2008 and 2011 in most coun-
tries where data are available. While in 
many cases there is apparently still a 
large margin for a greater use of part-
time work, in some countries its presence 
is so high that there seems to be little 
room for any further significant increase.
Finally, in all countries, part-time work in 
the public sector is mostly, and in some 
cases almost exclusively, a female phe-
nomenon, especially in the education, 
health and social work activities, where 
women are often 90 % of all part-timers, 
or even more (Table 3.5).
Temporary employment. The incidence of 
temporary employment in the public sec-
tor as a whole varies strongly across EU 
countries, ranging in 2011 from around 
7–8 % in the UK, Luxembourg, and Greece 
to more than 20 % in Spain, Portugal and 
Finland (Table 3.6). This reflects more 
general differences in national economic 
structures and regulatory systems across 
Europe. Despite these variations, tem-
porary employment is systematically 
more widespread in the public sector 
as a whole than in the entire economy, 
with the exceptions of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, the Netherlands and 
Poland. The difference between the pub-
lic sector and the entire economy is par-
ticularly high in countries such as Finland 
(8 percentage points in 2011, 21.6 % and 
13.5 %, respectively), Germany (16.8 % 
and 12.9 %), Norway, Denmark, Portugal, 
in part Austria and Belgium and until 
recently Cyprus, Greece and the Czech 
Republic. One obvious hypothesis for why 
this is the case could be the search for 
numerical flexibility in contexts where 
the regulatory framework of the employ-
ment relationship is particularly rigid, 
including employment security. A second 
hypothesis could be linked to attempts to 
contain labour costs. In other cases, the 
use of temporary employment could be 
a way of bypassing strict rules on hiring 
new employees on permanent contracts, 
as in some periods in Italy (Pedersini and 
Coletto 2009).
However, wide variations also exist 
between the different public sector 
activities. While temporary employment 
is in all countries less widespread, in the 
public administration, defence and social 
security sub-sector, it is usually notably 
more commonly used in the education, 
health and social work activities, with 
only three exceptions regarding educa-
tion (Spain, Hungary and Slovakia) and 
a few more cases with reference to 
health activities.
In some countries, such as the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, France, 
Italy, Poland (with wide variations over 
time), and Norway, a decreasing trend 
in the proportion, and at times also in 
the number, of temporary employees 
can be observed in recent years. This 
might have occurred because of two 
very different reasons, converging how-
ever towards the same result. On the one 
hand are government ‘stabilisation’ poli-
cies adopted within programs to reduce 
precarious employment, at times under 
trade union pressure, as has been the 
case to some extent in France and Italy, 
in the latter country especially in the 
education sector. On the other hand, 
and more recently (2011 and 2010), 
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are job cutting measures adopted within 
austerity programmes as a reaction to 
the economic crisis that have first of all 
affected temporary employees whose 
contracts have not been renewed (see 
also Chapter 4). Some countries, such as 
Italy and France, have experienced both 
measures in different years.
In other countries, however, the incidence 
of temporary employment has signifi-
cantly increased, for example in Slovakia, 
Hungary, Portugal, Austria, and, to a 
lesser extent, Germany and the UK. In 
Slovakia, Hungary, Portugal and Austria 
this increase has been greater than in the 
entire economy. As already mentioned, 
this may be linked to the search for 
numerical flexibility within particularly 
rigid regulatory frameworks (including 
hiring rules) and to attempts to contain 
or reduce labour costs.
Age. A final feature with regard to the 
structure of public sector employment is 
age. In Table 3.7 this feature is measured 
by the ratio between young employees, 
from 15 to 39 years of age, and older 
employees of 50 years of age or over. 
Three characteristics are worth stress-
ing. First, in the large majority of coun-
tries the ratio between young and older 
employees is lower in the public sector 
as a whole than in the entire economy, 
and in several cases much lower. This 
means that public sector employees 
are relatively older (see also OECD, 
Government at a Glance 2011: 106–07). 
The exceptions are Romania and partly 
Luxembourg, while Portugal, Cyprus and 
Slovenia in recent years have markedly 
reversed their previously younger public 
sector employment structure; in Cyprus 
this coincided with a sharp decrease in 
temporary employment. A few coun-
tries, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Italy, 
Lithuania, Finland, and, until 2010, 
Sweden, display a ratio of below 1, 
which means an employment structure 
clearly biased towards older employ-
ees. This bias is particularly marked in 
Italy. Second, in all countries there is 
wide variation within the public sector 
between the different activities. While 
in several EU-15 countries the pub-
lic administration, defence and social 
security activities have an older employ-
ment structure than the education and 
health subsectors (Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, France, Spain, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, 
Sweden, and Norway) the opposite is 
true for all eastern European countries, 
plus the UK. In other cases the picture is 
less definite, such as in Italy, where the 
oldest employment structure is found in 
education activities. Third, in the major-
ity of countries a decreasing trend in 
the public sector young/older employees 
ratio is observable, resulting in part from 
cuts in temporary employment and in the 
replacement ratio, albeit not always more 
pronounced than in the entire economy. 
The few exceptions include the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Malta, and in part 
Sweden, while in another group the ratio 
remains stable (Denmark, Luxembourg). 
Exceptions aside, on the whole younger 
workers seem to be harder hit by the 
crisis than their older counterparts.
In connection with measures recently 
adopted by many governments in 
response to the crisis— such as 
replacement freezes, cuts in tempo-
rary employment, worsening wage 
and working conditions that make 
public sector jobs less attractive, 
cuts in training expenditure, reforms 
of the pension systems that raise 
the general retirement age of pub-
lic employees (see also Chapter 6) 
while at the same time temporarily 
encouraging early retirement to reduce 
employment levels and labour costs— 
this age structure might lead to unex-
pected and problematic consequences. 
Depending on the national conditions 
and the specific mix of measures, one 
consequence could be a further age-
ing of the public sector workforce. 
A second consequence might be a 
change in the skills composition of 
public sector employees, with a loss 
of human capital. Other possible con-
sequences include staff shortages, 
mobility to the private sector or migra-
tion abroad, which has happened in the 
case of health professions in several 
eastern European countries such as 
Estonia, Hungary, Romania, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia (Masso 
and Espenberg 2012: 69; Hámori and 
Kölló 2012: 175). A final consequence 
is a potential worsening of the quality 
of public services (Vaughan-Whitehead 
2012: 15, 17, 20). Some of these poten-
tial outcomes, of course, depend on 
how reforms are designed and imple-
mented, while the expected results are 
enhanced levels of efficiency.
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Table 3.3 Employment of women, 2011
% total employed in sector, 15 years and over
Total economy Total public 
sector
Public 
administration, 
defence, social 
security
Education Health and 
social work 
activities
EU-27 45.5 66.9 46.1 71.3 78.0
EU-15 45.5 66.7 45.7 69.9 77.7
CEECs 45.4 66.3 45.5 69.8 77.3
Belgium 45.4 67.0 47.9 69.7 77.7
Bulgaria 47.9 66.7 45.1 80.9 81.0
Czech Republic 43.0 68.5 47.8 76.5 81.5
Denmark 47.4 70.3 54.0 58.2 81.0
Germany 46.1 66.9 47.6 69.4 76.8
Estonia 50.5 75.8 54.3 85.3 84.8
Ireland 46.6 72.2 47.8 74.7 81.3
Greece 40.3 52.8 34.8 65.0 64.3
Spain 44.8 61.5 42.3 65.8 77.2
France 47.5 66.9 51.2 66.4 78.6
Italy 40.7 60.5 34.0 76.3 68.6
Cyprus 45.3 59.9 38.3 72.3 74.1
Latvia 50.7 75.5 56.6 82.5 84.7
Lithuania 51.4 73.9 51.3 78.4 87.0
Luxembourg 43.4 56.8 34.7 65.2 76.0
Hungary 46.0 67.7 49.3 76.7 77.8
Malta 34.6 51.7 31.5 65.4 57.7
Netherlands 46.2 68.8 39.1 62.8 83.1
Austria 46.2 65.3 43.6 70.4 77.3
Poland 44.9 69.7 50.3 77.4 81.7
Portugal 46.8 66.3 37.0 76.7 80.7
Romania 45.0 62.4 38.6 74.6 78.3
Slovenia 45.9 70.8 49.3 79.0 82.1
Slovakia 44.3 70.3 51.6 79.9 83.2
Finland 48.3 76.2 54.0 66.3 87.2
Sweden 47.4 73.9 54.9 72.9 82.0
United Kingdom 46.4 70.2 50.0 72.0 78.4
Norway 47.5 71.9 48.8 63.7 81.2
Source: LFS Eurostat.
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Table 3.4 Part-time employment, 2011
 % in each sector, 15 years and over
Total economy Total public 
sector
Public 
administration, 
defence, social 
security
Education Health and 
social work 
activities
EU-27 19.5 24.8 13.1 25.9 32.1
EU-15 22.5 28.2 15.2 30.0 35.2
CEECs 22.4 28.1 15.1 30.1 35.1
Belgium 25.1 35.4 23.5 31.2 46.1
Bulgaria 2.4     
Czech Republic 5.5 8.0 3.8 12.2 8.2
Denmark 25.9 31.3 15.0 24.6 39.3
Germany 26.6 34.1 17.9 40.7 40.1
Estonia 10.6 18.9  3.5 19.8 17.5
Ireland 23.5 26.3 11.6 24.4 33.8
Greece 6.8 4.9 1.6 9.6 3.9
Spain 13.8 12.0 5.4 17.0 14.5
France 17.9 23.8 17.9 24.0 28.1
Italy 15.5 13.7 7.3 12.6 20.1
Cyprus 10.0   16.8 8.8
Latvia 9.2   10.3 10.1
Lithuania 8.7   11.9 7.6
Luxembourg 18.3 26.7 18.1 23.2 39.6
Hungary 6.8 7.6 10.0 6.6 6.0
Malta 13.2 12.9 5.4 13.5 20.4
Netherlands 49.1 63.9 32.6 61.0 77.4
Austria 25.2 32.2 19.9 30.5 42.2
Poland 8.0 7.2 3.0 9.7 8.9
Portugal 13.3 6.0 2.1 10.4 5.0
Romania 10.5     
Slovenia 10.4 8.9 5.1 11.1 9.7
Slovakia 4.1 7.8 13.8 4.8 3.6
Finland 14.9 14.0 6.0 15.6 15.7
Sweden 25.9 36.5 18.2 32.2 46.7
United Kingdom 26.8 33.4 18.4 38.4 36.6
Norway 28.1 37.5 13.3 31.0 46.5
Source: LFS Eurostat.
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Table 3.5 Women as a percentage of total employed part-time in each sector, 2011
15 years and over
Total economy Total public 
sector
Public 
administration, 
defence, social 
security
Education Health and 
social work 
activities
EU-27 74.8 85.6 80.1 81.0 89.7
EU-15 76.1 86.0 81.4 81.4 89.8
CEECs 76.3 86.0 81.5 81.3 89.9
Belgium 78.6 88.0 83.7 82.6 91.9
Bulgaria 52.4
Czech Republic 73.8 80.7 65.3 81.5 86.6
Denmark 68.9 83.2 77.1 71.3 87.5
Germany 79.2 86.4 87.3 80.9 88.9
Estonia 73.6 82.3
Ireland 70.8 88.5 84.9 83.1 91.4
Greece 60.7 75.1 62.1 77.2 76.6
Spain 76.0 80.5 70.7 75.1 89.4
France 79.8 86.1 81.9 81.2 90.2
Italy 77.2 83.3 71.8 83.4 86.8
Cyprus 59.0 83.7 92.3
Latvia 59.5 75.0
Lithuania 61.6 72.0 91.4
Luxembourg 85.2 89.4 83.3 85.7 94.4
Hungary 62.3 64.4 55.2 70.5 74.2
Malta 67.3 76.2 86.2
Netherlands 72.2 86.0 71.3 76.1 91.7
Austria 80.9 88.2 85.7 85.0 90.6
Poland 62.3 75.6 63.8 71.8 85.6
Portugal 57.3 71.5 71.9
Romania 49.5
Slovenia 58.9 69.4 60.0 65.5 81.1
Slovakia 62.6 65.0 51.9 87.3 94.8
Finland 63.5 81.8 78.6 74.2 85.6
Sweden 72.1 85.4 75.1 82.6 88.4
United Kingdom 74.7 87.4 83.1 84.7 90.7
Norway 72.3 84.4 62.7 73.7 88.8
Source: LFS Eurostat.
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3.4. Employment 
status and 
the right to 
collective 
bargaining
The nature and regulation of the employ-
ment relationship of public employees 
are crucial features that directly affect 
collective bargaining and industrial rela-
tions in the sector. Put simply, it makes 
a difference whether all or a significant 
part of public employees are denied the 
right to collectively negotiate terms and 
conditions of employment or the right to 
take industrial action. These features, in 
turn, are linked to the legal and admin-
istrative tradition in each country.
In the comparative public administration 
literature, a standard distinction is made 
between countries with a Rechtsstaat 
tradition, either of Napoleonic or 
Prussian origin, and the Anglo-Saxon 
model (Kickert 2007, 2008; Peters 2010; 
Painter and Peters 2010; Ziller 2003). 
Within the first tradition, typical of many 
continental European countries, despite 
considerable differences among them, 
a basic feature was the primacy of the 
law, whereby laws and regulations were 
the exclusive source of administrative 
action and administration was mainly 
restricted to executing legislation and 
administering regulations based on the 
law (Kickert 2007: 28–9). Linked to this 
strongly legalistic conception was a body 
of state officials whose tasks were to 
fulfil sovereign functions on behalf of the 
authority of the state (external defence, 
internal order, administration of justice, 
administration of taxes). Within such a 
framework, it was hardly conceivable 
that these functionaries could have inter-
ests in contrast to the general interest of 
the state of which they were servants. 
Hence a distinctive model of employ-
ment regulation was derived, separated 
from that prevailing in the private sec-
tor and characterised by two essential 
elements. On the one hand, they were 
denied collective bargaining rights (and 
at times also the right to strike and the 
right of association) in favour of the 
unilateral regulation of terms and con-
ditions of employment through laws or 
administrative measures. On the other 
hand, they enjoyed a special employment 
status consisting of various substantive 
and procedural prerogatives, in terms 
of recruitment procedures, employment 
security, a career path based on seniority, 
pension treatment, and other guaran-
tees. In case of dispute, their regulation 
was subject to administrative law and 
administrative tribunals. The employ-
ment relations approach linked to this 
framework is often labelled in the litera-
ture as the ‘sovereign employer model’ 
to stress the unilateralism that charac-
terises it (Beaumont 1992).
By contrast, within the common law tra-
dition of the British experience, there is 
no fundamental division between public 
and private sector employment legisla-
tion: the legal boundaries between the 
two areas of employment have never 
been clearly demarcated. The distinction 
between administrative law and admin-
istrative tribunals, on the one hand, and 
civil law and ordinary courts, on the 
other hand, is absent. Also the formal 
status of civil servants has been uncer-
tain for many decades, until the High 
Court in 1991 recognised that they were 
employed by the Crown under contracts 
of employment (Winchester and Bach 
1999: 22–3). Despite this absence of 
legal distinction, even in the British public 
services, for decades employment rela-
tions followed a different pattern from 
that prevailing in the private sector, often 
summarised as the ‘model employer’ 
approach (Beaumont 1992). The main 
feature of this model is the preference 
for joint regulation and a generally more 
‘benign’ attitude of the employer towards 
the employees and trade unions than in 
the private sector (see Section 5).
In no country has either of these two 
approaches been implemented in their 
full ideal-type configuration (Bordogna 
2003 and 2007). Leaving aside impor-
tant differences, however, both mod-
els identified a distinctive relationship 
between the state and its employees 
which differed in important respects 
from the regulation of employment in 
the private sector. This distinction is 
based on the acknowledgment of the 
unique role of the State as employer, 
and of the particular context— the set of 
incentives and constraints— in which the 
public sector employer operates (Ferner 
1985; Beaumont 1992).
This distinctiveness of public sector 
employment regulation partly weak-
ened in the 1960s and 1970s as the 
number of public employees involved in 
education, health and social work activi-
ties increased rapidly in connection with 
the expansion of the welfare state and 
soon exceeded the workforce employed 
in the traditional functions of the state 
(Treu 1987). As a consequence, in several 
countries where collective bargaining 
was previously banned, the right to bar-
gain started to be recognised for various 
groups of public employees, although at 
times with a number of limitations.
Further challenges to this separate 
regulation came in connection with the 
bureaucratic reform agenda pursued in 
many countries in the 1980s and 1990s, 
often along the guidelines of the New 
Public Management (NPM) doctrine. NPM 
aimed to remove any difference between 
the public and the private sector as a way 
of increasing the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of public services (OECD 1995; 
Hood 1991 and 1995; Bordogna 2008; 
Pedersini 2009; Pollitt and Bouckaert 
2011; Pollitt 2011). Beside the UK, moves 
in this direction have taken place in sev-
eral continental European countries, such 
as Italy and the Nordic countries. Italy, 
for example, used to share the legalistic 
administrative tradition of France and of 
German Beamte, with a separate system 
of employment regulation and the uni-
lateral determination of pay and work-
ing conditions. However, after a partial 
change in 1983, Italy went through a 
major reform in 1992–1993, reinforced 
in 1997–1998. The employment rela-
tionship of more than 80 % of Italian 
public employees was privatised and 
contractualised, including for managers 
EUEMP12A-1231-01-I01 - Industrial Relations in Europe Report 2012.indb   104 27/06/2013   10:34:19
105
CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TRANSITION
(and top level managers since 1998). 
Collective bargaining became the main 
method of regulating terms and condi-
tions of employment, and the exclusive 
method with regard to pay, possibly sup-
plemented by individual negotiations for 
top managers. Jurisdiction shifted from 
administrative law and courts to the civil 
code and ordinary tribunals, reducing the 
scope of the special prerogatives enjoyed 
by public employees in relation to the 
private sector workforce. The traditional 
career-based system for managerial 
staff was also partially amended, allow-
ing the recruitment of a certain propor-
tion of personnel on a contractual basis 
from outside the public administration 
(Bordogna and Neri 2011).
Similar developments have taken place 
in the Nordic countries, with reductions 
in special statutory employment protec-
tion for civil servants and the determi-
nation of parts or all of their terms and 
conditions of employment via collective 
negotiations at central and local level 
(Ibsen et al. 2011). In the Netherlands as 
well, a shift from unilateral regulation of 
terms and conditions of employment on 
the part of the government (Minister of 
the Interior) towards collective negotia-
tions at sectoral level have taken place 
since 1993, meaning that that central 
government can no longer unilaterally 
change existing conditions (Steijn & 
Leisink, 2007).
However, despite several institutional 
and policy changes implemented over 
the past three decades along the above-
mentioned guidelines, it is generally rec-
ognised that the ‘set of rules that govern 
pay and working conditions still differ 
significantly across private and public 
sectors in most EU countries’, as recently 
stressed by an ECB working paper 
(Giordano et al. 2011: 7). Other compara-
tive studies confirm this feature, stress-
ing that the NPM-inspired reforms were 
less widespread than expected (Pollitt 
et al. 2007; Goldfinch and Wallis 2010; 
Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011; Pollitt 2011), 
and have had differentiated effects on 
public service employment relations 
(Bordogna 2008; Bach and Bordogna 
2011). In particular, in several countries 
the special status of employment has 
not been abolished for large sections, 
or even the totality of public employ-
ees. The clearest examples if this are 
Germany and France. In Germany, civil 
servants, or Beamte, to whom the right 
to strike and the right to collective bar-
gaining are denied, still make up around 
38–40 % of total public employees, 
unevenly distributed in all the three lev-
els of government— federal, state and 
municipal, with a greater density at the 
first two levels (Keller 2011; EPSU 2008). 
This group is still governed by public law, 
with a special service and loyalty rela-
tionship with the administration. Career 
public servants are appointed with, in 
principle, permanent tenure, not hired on 
a contractual basis. Their status is clearly 
separated from the group of white- and 
blue-collar employees (Angestellte and 
Arbeiter  (3), governed by private law and 
with the same rights as their private sec-
tor counterparts. The ratio between the 
two groups has been relatively stable 
over time (Keller 2011). Even after pri-
vatisation, a large number of German 
railways and postal service employees 
retain the status of Beamte, with the 
privileges and restrictions attached to 
this (ETUI 2008). In France, all the fonc-
tionnaires publiques titulaires, which are 
almost the totality of public employees, 
still have a special employment status 
subject to administrative law and with 
rather weak bargaining rights, even after 
the 2010 law on the renewal of social 
dialogue in the public sector (Bordogna 
and Neri 2011; EUROFOUND 2010b). To 
a lesser extent, in many other continental 
European countries there is a group of 
public employees with a special employ-
ment status (Austria, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech 
Republic, Poland, and Romania), although 
(3)  The legal distinction between white and 
blue-collar employees (Angestellte and 
Arbeiter) was abolished in 2005 by collective 
agreement (TVöD), and since then a new 
uniform classification system exists for the 
two groups (Arbeitnehmer), separated from 
career civil servants (Beamte).
precise employment conditions may vary 
from country to country, and a reduction 
in special prerogatives in the direction 
of harmonization with the private sector 
has recently taken place, driven partly 
by economic pressures (see for instance 
Greece, in Ioannou 2012). Further, the 
proportion of this group in terms of total 
public sector employment, while usually 
higher in the central government/pub-
lic administration sector, varies across 
countries (see also various national stud-
ies in Vaughan-Whitehead 2012).
In brief, while the right to organise is 
most unproblematic and the right to 
strike is most problematic for public 
sector employees throughout the differ-
ent countries, the picture is more varied 
and uncertain with regards to collective 
bargaining rights. In many countries this 
right, at least for certain groups of public 
sector workers, ‘is widely restricted or is 
embedded in specific structures and pro-
cedures that do not allow for the same 
bargaining rights, coverage and results 
as in the private sector’ (Clauwaert and 
Warneck 2008: 22–23; also Gernigon 
2007; Casale 2008).
3.5. Trade unions 
and employers
Public sector industrial relations often 
display peculiar features not only in 
terms of the regulation of employment 
relations, but also with reference to rep-
resentation, both on the employee and 
employer sides.
First, union densities are systematically 
higher than in the private sector (see for 
instance Visser 2006, Pedersini 2010a). 
Of course, this concerns the sections of 
public sector employment with full right 
of association (which, as mentioned 
above, is the least problematic element 
of industrial relations in the public sector 
and can be regarded as generally avail-
able). The main reason for this is the 
positive attitude that public employers 
typically have with respect to recognition 
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of the role of trade unions, which often 
takes the form of promotional meas-
ures in terms of special union rights 
and prerogatives, for example, time 
off to carry out union activities (Clegg 
1976). In practice, public employees are 
unlikely to encounter negative attitudes 
concerning union affiliation from their 
employer (while this can happen in the 
private sector), which may affect their 
career prospects. Moreover, given the 
traditional homogeneous character of 
terms and conditions of employment in 
the public sector, with less room for indi-
vidual bargaining— although increasing 
in recent decades, at least for certain 
occupations— improvements in terms 
of higher wages and better working 
conditions can be attained essentially 
by collective action and representation 
through trade unions. In other terms, in 
the public sector, participation costs are 
lower and the ‘free riding’ alternative is 
weaker as individual advancements are 
difficult to achieve. In some cases, being 
part of a union can also bring specific 
benefits in terms of a better capacity to 
protect individual interests through the 
pressure union representatives can exert 
on a politically sensitive employer.
Second, union representation tends to 
be more segmented than in the private 
sector. This reflects, on the one hand, 
the significant presence in the public 
sector of relatively strong professional 
groups and identities, such as those 
involved in the medical professions, 
teachers and professors, and higher 
functionaries. On the other hand, the 
absence of market constraints, the 
political sensitivity of employment 
issues and the relevant bargaining 
power that certain groups of public 
employees hold, such as those of a par-
ticular contract type, can encourage the 
creation of a plurality of professional 
trade unions, which in some cases may 
pursue particularistic objectives, that 
is, the improvement of the conditions 
of their specific constituency with-
out considering the impacts of their 
demands on other groups of workers 
or on the public at large.
Third, on the employer side, with par-
ticular reference to the bargaining table, 
there are political entities and repre-
sentatives (such as ministries and min-
isters) or independent agencies. Again, 
the absence of market constraints makes 
political decisions crucial, for instance in 
terms of the economic resources avail-
able for wage bargaining. However, there 
can be important differences depending 
on whether the responsibility of negotia-
tions and consultation with trade unions 
lies with direct political representatives 
or administrative officers and man-
agers (the ‘employers’ in practice) or 
independent agencies. This latter solu-
tion increases the distance between the 
political sphere and the regulation of 
public employment relations— and it 
is therefore often proposed in order to 
emulate private sector conditions; how-
ever, this has some potential drawbacks 
linked to the loss of direct knowledge of 
organisational features and day-to-day 
work issues and practices.
3.5.1. Trade union density
The issue of trade union density in the 
public sector was introduced in Chapter 1 
of this report. Table 3.8 shows trade 
union density in the public and private 
sectors at the end of 2000s and, where 
available, variations since the beginning 
of the decade. As the data illustrate, 
trade union density in the public sector is 
systematically higher than in the private 
sector. The difference can be very wide, 
as in the UK (57 % vs. 15 %), Greece 
(64 % vs. 19 %), and Ireland (67 % vs. 
21 %). The difference is particularly sig-
nificant in some of the Nordic countries: 
in Norway it is more than 40 percentage 
points (80 % compared with 38 %) and 
in Finland it is over 30 percentage points 
(82 % compared with 50 %).
Further, the trend in the most recent dec-
ade seems to indicate a stronger capac-
ity of public sector unions to contrast the 
erosion of density. However, in this case 
there are several exceptions and the dif-
ference is not always wide. The stronger 
position of the public sector is clearly 
evident in Denmark, Finland (where pri-
vate sector unionisation fell by nearly 
20 percentage points in the 2000s) and 
Norway (two percentage points less in 
the public sector and five in the private 
sector). Ireland even shows a positive 
trend in the public sector (+ 11 percent-
age points) and a negative trend in the 
private sector (-10 percentage points). 
But in the other cases there is no sub-
stantial difference (Austria, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the UK). 
France shows a decrease of public sec-
tor union density, compared to stabil-
ity in the private sector. However, this 
takes place in the context of a very 
low density rate in the private sector 
(4.5 %), which may be considered a sort 
of minimum level with limited scope for 
further decrease. The importance of the 
public sector for trade unions is also 
apparent when looking at the share of 
members in total national union mem-
bership. It is usually above one third of 
all union members, with a peak of 61 % 
in the UK and other countries where it 
exceeds 50 % (Greece, France, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and Norway).
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Table 3.8 Trade union density in the public and private sectors  
in selected EU countries, 2000–2009
Public sector  
( % employees)
Private sector  
( % employees)
Public sector  
( % national 
union membership)
Public sector  
 %-point change 
2000–09
Private sector  
 %-point change 
2000–09
AT 53.0 33.0 40.0 -7.0 -6.0
BE n.a. n.a. 25.0 n.a. n.a.
DE 36.0 17.0 40.0 -6.0 -6.0
DK 83.0 62.0 40.0 -3.9 -9.6
EL 63.8 19.4 55.9 n.a. n.a.
ES n.a. n.a. 31.2 n.a. n.a.
FI 81.6 50.4 40.1 -7.4 -19.6
FR 15.0 4.5 57.0 -2.0 0.0
IE 66.6 21.1 54.2 10.6 -9.9
IT 50.0 32.2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
LU n.a. n.a. 30.7 n.a. n.a.
NL 38.0 15.0 51.0 -4.0 -4.0
NO 80.0 38.0 52.0 -2.0 -5.0
PT 45.0 37.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
SE 84.0 65.0 49.0 -8.0 -9.0
UK 56.6 15.1 61.1 -3.7 -3.7
Source: ICTWSS (Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts),  
http://www.uva-aias.net/208.
It must be mentioned however that den-
sity rates are often lower in the countries 
not covered by Table 3.8, because data 
are not available. According to a recent 
study (Bordogna 2007), unionisation, 
at least in central government, is ‘quite 
often close to zero […] in most of the for-
mer communist countries of central and 
eastern Europe’. This refers in particular 
to the three Baltic countries (Estonia, 
Lithuania and Latvia), where union mem-
bership was practically non-existent in 
2006, and to the Czech Republic, Poland 
(3 %) and Slovakia (10 %). The excep-
tions are Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Romania, where union density was gen-
erally above 25 % and exceeded 50 % 
in Romania.
3.5.2. Trade union 
structure
An indication of the fragmentation 
of trade union representation in the 
public sector can be derived from the 
representativeness studies carried out 
by the European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions. In recent years, a number 
of sectoral representativeness studies 
have been published, including three 
on significant parts of the three sec-
tors under review here: public admin-
istration (2011), education (2011) and 
hospitals (2009). Table 3.9 indicates 
the number of trade unions covered by 
the studies. All three studies include a 
high number of trade unions (private 
sector studies usually include a far 
lower number of unions, often under 
100 and in rare instances only slightly 
above this threshold). The fragmenta-
tion of representation is particularly evi-
dent in public administration and the 
health sector. It is also interesting to 
note that the representational domain 
of the trade unions in both sectors is 
often ‘sectional’ (50 % in public admin-
istration and 62 % in education), that 
is, it includes only part of the sector, 
for instance some special occupational 
groups. This is contrary to the tendency 
emerging in the private sector, where, 
following mergers between indus-
trial unions and in presence of broad 
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representational domains (such as 
all blue- or white-collar workers), the 
most common situation is ‘overlap’, with 
membership spanning different sectors. 
Multi-unionism is particularly present 
in certain countries (Italy, Portugal, and 
Denmark), but especially in the public 
administration sector it appears as a 
common feature across EU countries. 
See also Chapter 1 of this report for 
details of the individual unions operat-
ing in the public sector.
Table 3.9 Number of trade unions covered by the Eurofound 
representativeness studies (Public administration, 
Education, Hospitals)
Public 
administration Education Hospitals
AT 4 4 5
BE 4 12 8
BG 6 4 2
CY 1 8 7
CZ 5 3 3
DE 7 6 5
DK 24 10 18
EE 2 3 4
ES 6 9 5
FI 8 8 7
FR 7 12 8
EL 2 4 5
HU 8 7 6
IE 9 6 8
IT 56 24 19
LT 4 4 4
LU 5 6 2
LV 6 1 2
MT 4 4 4
NL 15 10 3
PL 7 5 4
PT 14 36 11
RO 17 4 4
SE 9 10 10
SI 9 3 5
SK 8 3 1
UK 9 10 12
Total 256 216 172
Mean 9,5 8,0 6,4
Source: EIRO, Representativeness studies, http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/
representativeness.htm
3.5.3. Employer 
representatives
As suggested above, the nature of the 
bargaining party in the public sector 
can be quite different and this can have 
important consequences on the nego-
tiation process and outcomes. Basically, 
we can distinguish between ‘technical’ 
bodies, established either as an inde-
pendent entity or within a government 
structure; ‘managerial’ representatives, 
which means that the relevant senior 
manager of the public organisation is 
directly responsible for negotiations; 
or ‘political’ representatives, when the 
bargaining process is conducted directly 
by a political representative (such as a 
minister or mayor).
If we concentrate, in this case, on the pub-
lic administration, the above mentioned 
representativeness study (Eurofound 
2011a: p. 33) shows that the presence of 
‘independent agencies/separately man-
aged bodies’ which bargain on behalf 
of public authorities is quite limited and 
involves only Denmark, Finland, Italy and 
Sweden. In other countries or for distinct 
sections of the public administration, 
‘associations of regional/local state level 
administration’ are present. This is the 
case, for instance, in Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg 
and Sweden. It is interesting to note that 
some of these bodies and associations 
are public law bodies with compulsory 
membership. This is the case in Italy, 
where Aran bargains on behalf of all 
public administrations at the national 
level; Denmark, with SEA, the State 
Employer’s Authority; Finland, where KT 
groups together local authorities and 
VTML covers central government; and 
Sweden, where AV is the Swedish Agency 
for Government Employers.
However, in 17 of the 26 countries cov-
ered by the study (France was excluded 
from the study), ‘it is the central state or 
regional authorities themselves rather 
than separate employers’ associations 
which conduct negotiations with organ-
ised labour or unilaterally determine 
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the employment conditions’ (Eurofound 
2011a, p. 33). Therefore, we can consider 
that, in the majority of cases, the regu-
lation of the employment relationship 
within the public administration sector 
remains very close to political responsi-
bility and authority.
3.5.4. European sectoral 
social dialogue
In addition to national bargaining, 
there are a number of European sec-
toral social dialogue committees which 
cover the public sector. For example, 
the committee for Local and Regional 
Government involves the European 
Federation of Public Service Unions 
(EPSU) and the Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions (CCRE-
CEMR). Although it started to work for-
mally in 2004, the parties had already 
been working together since 1998. 
For example, CEMR and EPSU adopted 
a joint declaration in 1998 on equal-
ity between men and women at work. 
Building on this experience and on the 
actions taken by member organisations 
following this joint declaration (such as 
positive action programmes, diversifi-
cation of women’s educational and pro-
fessional choices, campaigning against 
sexual harassment, encouraging work-
life balance and supporting equal pay 
for work of equal value), CCRE-CEMR and 
EPSU agreed in 2007 a set of joint guide-
lines for equality action plans in local 
and regional government. In 2004, they 
identified four themes to structure their 
cooperation over the following years: 
strengthening social dialogue in local and 
regional government in the new Member 
States and in candidate countries; sup-
porting the reform process in local and 
regional government; promoting diversity 
and equality in local and regional gov-
ernment; and evaluating experience in 
various forms of service provision.
This sectoral social dialogue committee 
has also agreed a series of joint state-
ments on the economic crisis on the 
occasion of different European Council 
meetings (February 2009, February 2010, 
December 2010, October 2011). In the 
face of increasing austerity meas-
ures, the European social partners 
have consistently stressed the need 
to adequately fund local authorities in 
order to enable them to provide ser-
vices to citizens. They maintain that a 
coordinated and well-organised public 
sector is a key element to be ‘better 
able to react to the crisis and deliver 
or contribute to solutions for citizens’ 
(February 2010 Joint Statement). 
Indeed, CCRE-CEMR and EPSU under-
line that it is ‘unacceptable that many 
local and regional governments are 
confronted with decreasing revenue 
at a time when demands are increas-
ing’, and they highlight ‘the capacity 
to maintain and develop competent 
and motivated staff’ (February 2010 
Joint Statement). Moreover, the 2011 
Joint Statement states that ‘resources 
for local and regional government are 
continuously cut, which leaves local 
and regional government with new and 
greater obligations to maintain quality 
local public services’, with greater risks 
of exclusion for ‘the most vulnerable, 
the young, the elderly, the low-skilled 
or the unemployed’.
They are also demanding a more 
prominent voice and the recogni-
tion of the role of the public sector in 
EU policies. In their response to the 
European Commission’s Green Paper 
on Restructuring and anticipation of 
change: what lessons from recent 
experiences? of 30 March 2012, EPSU 
and CCRE-CEMR express their concern 
that austerity measures and labour law 
reforms may weaken social dialogue 
when it is most needed to accompany 
restructuring in the public sector and 
emphasise the positive contribution that 
social dialogue has played in certain 
countries. They maintain that ‘the finan-
cial crisis has highlighted the important 
leading role of local and regional gov-
ernments in providing support […] for 
new jobs, education, training, employ-
ment, social protection and adapted 
service provision to their region/area’. 
Moreover, they argue that ‘the best 
anticipative long term approach to 
restructuring and changes is through 
Social Dialogue based on trust’.
For hospitals and healthcare, a social 
dialogue committee was established 
in 2006 and includes EPSU and the 
European Hospital and Healthcare 
Employers Association (HOSPEEM). EPSU 
and HOSPEEM signed in 2008 a code of 
conduct and follow up on Ethical Cross-
Border Recruitment and Retention in 
the Hospital Sector. The implementation 
phase was expected to last three years 
and at the end of the fourth year an 
assessment of the project will be under-
taken. This sectoral social dialogue com-
mittee has not addressed the economic 
crisis directly, concentrating instead on 
specific issues such as the prevention of 
sharp injuries in 2009 or the recognition 
of professional qualifications in 2011, 
as a response to the European 
Commission’s Green Paper on Reviewing 
the Directive on the Recognition of 
Professional Qualifications 2005/36/EC.
In education, a sectoral social dialogue 
committee was set up in 2010 with ETUCE 
(the European Trade Union Committee for 
Education) on the employee side and EFEE 
(the European Federation of Education 
Employers) for the employers. The com-
mittee adopted its first joint texts in 
January 2011. The first is a joint declara-
tion which supports investing in education, 
training and research as an ‘investment 
in the future’ to foster sustainable growth 
and social well-being. The second covers a 
set of ‘Joint Guidelines on Trans-regional 
cooperation in Lifelong Learning among 
education stakeholders’, which are to be 
implemented in 2011–2012 and assessed 
in 2013. In addition, the social partners in 
this sector have engaged in joint work on 
a number of projects, including on work-
related stress, recruitment and retention, 
and skills development.
Most recently a new sectoral social 
dialogue committee was launched for 
Central Government Administrations 
in December 2010. It brings together 
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TUNED (the Trade Unions’ National and 
European Administration Delegation), 
which is an EPSU-led trade union del-
egation consisting of affiliates of EPSU 
and CESI, and EUPAE (European Union 
Public Administration Employers). In June 
2011, these social partners agreed on a 
2011–2013 work programme which 
includes responses to European 
Commission initiatives such as the revi-
sion of the working time Directive, the 
free movement of workers in the pub-
lic sector, gender equality and skills 
and training, improving the image and 
attractiveness of the civil service, and 
moves to ‘develop further a joint reflec-
tion on the effects of the crisis and the 
measures taken in the central govern-
ment administrations, in particular in col-
lecting and analysing data with regards 
to the impact on well being at work, 
the civil service attractiveness, and the 
challenges of recruitment in times of 
demographic changes’ (Social Dialogue 
Committee for Central Government 
Administrations 2011: 3).
In December 2011, TUNED and EUPAE 
released a statement on the ‘Effects 
of the Crisis in the Central Government 
Administrations’ which recalled that 
austerity measures were affecting 
the sector’s workforce, its remunera-
tion and potentially its working condi-
tions. The statement underlined the 
importance of public administration in 
addressing the crisis and providing citi-
zens with adequate services as well as 
the crucial role of workers in achieving 
these goals. The response of this sec-
toral social dialogue committee to the 
European Commission’s Green Paper on 
Restructuring and Anticipation of Change: 
What lessons from recent experiences? 
underlines how the financial crisis has on 
the one hand ‘highlighted the important 
role central government administrations 
play in regulating the market, providing 
employment and social protection and 
jobs’, and on the other hand has led to 
‘programmes of pay, pensions and job 
cuts or freezes, reforms of working con-
ditions as well as changes of labour law’. 
The social partners in this sector also 
state that ‘a major feature of restructur-
ing in the public sector is that the social 
dialogue has been sidelined’, although 
there are cases where social dialogue 
has contributed to settling disputes 
and overcoming tensions— for exam-
ple in Ireland, Lithuania and Slovenia— 
thereby showing ‘that it is possible for 
social dialogue to deliver results in tense 
national contexts’. In Slovenia, there 
are rising tensions in the area of social 
dialogue— for example, no new social 
agreement has yet been adopted since 
the expiry of the previous one in 2009 
due to the differing expectations of the 
social partners. Further, there is continu-
ing opposition from public sector unions 
to government plans for additional public 
sector pay cuts.
As can be seen, the economic crisis has 
been addressed in some of the sectoral 
social dialogue committees in the pub-
lic sector by means of joint statements. 
These documents have reviewed the 
impact of the economic downturn on 
the relevant sectors, notably central and 
local administrations, and stressed the 
importance of supporting public service 
provision through adequate funding and 
staffing, in terms of both employment 
and skill levels, and promoting social dia-
logue to accompany reform and restruc-
turing. In this sense, although they have 
contributed to the debate, they have not 
directly affected policy implementation.
3.6. Wage setting 
systems
In connection with the above-mentioned 
specific regulation of the employment 
relationship in the public sector, which 
persists in many EU countries, three 
formally different wage-setting sys-
tems can be found in the public sector: 
a) unilateral determination on the part 
of the government or public authorities, 
through laws or administrative acts; 
b) free collective bargaining, along the 
lines of wage setting in the private sec-
tor; c) mixed or hybrid arrangements, that 
are neither unilateral determination nor 
collective bargaining. The latter mecha-
nism refers mainly to the UK experience 
of the pay review bodies, which must be 
considered as a special case as they can-
not be equated with either of the above 
systems of pay determination, although 
they share some elements of both.
A further issue arises when the outcomes 
of negotiations need a decision of the 
government to be implemented. One 
possibility is that this decision is just a 
procedural formality that can be taken 
for granted, in which case this system 
can be classed as de facto collective bar-
gaining (the Italian experience between 
1983 and 1993, for instance, or Cyprus). 
A different possibility is when the out-
comes of negotiations are never binding 
for the government and can be substan-
tially amended or totally disregarded, as 
in France, in which case the system is 
closer to unilateral regulation than to 
collective bargaining.
In general terms, free collective bar-
gaining prevails in the UK (except for 
the groups of employees under the pay 
review body system), all the Nordic coun-
tries, Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Italy, Spain, and, with qualifications, 
Cyprus, Malta, Luxembourg, Greece and 
Portugal. In Portugal the government has 
the power to decide unilaterally in the 
case of a stalemate in negotiations. In 
Greece also, civil servants under public 
law have been permitted since 1999 to 
negotiate their terms and conditions of 
employment (training, health and safety, 
mobility, trade union prerogatives), but 
pay issues are excluded, while public 
sector employees under private con-
tracts enjoy full bargaining rights in 
line with rights enjoyed by private sec-
tor employees (Ioannou 1999; 2012). In 
Luxembourg, wage agreements must be 
confirmed by law.
In most Eastern European countries, the 
state plays a strong role in relation to trade 
unions and collective bargaining, with the 
exception of Slovenia, even when forms of 
joint consultation take place (ETUI Warneck 
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& Clauwaert 2009). In some cases, collec-
tive bargaining in a strict sense does not 
take place (Bulgaria, Poland), or its viability 
is very uncertain and indeterminate, as in 
the Baltic countries and Hungary (Masso 
and Espenberg 2012; Hámori and KÖllŎ 
2012). In others, negotiations take place, 
but they do not cover pay issues, and pay 
mechanisms are established by the state 
(the Czech Republic, Romania). In oth-
ers, negotiations are allowed, pay issues 
included, but agreements do not have 
validity until a formal decision is taken 
by the government or relevant authorities 
(Slovakia). On the whole, various restric-
tions on collective bargaining apply, and 
these have in many cases been further 
strengthened during the economic crisis. 
A case in point is Romania, where a 2011 
law seriously reduced the scope of social 
dialogue, to the advantage of legislative 
regulation, limited the extension of negoti-
ated provisions, and tightened representa-
tiveness criteria, further weakening the role 
of trade unions, despite their relatively high 
density rate (Vasile 2012).
In many cases, the above-mentioned 
institutional mechanisms co-exist in the 
same country, with a varying balance 
between them, applied to different seg-
ments of the public sector workforce; in 
other cases modified forms or contami-
nations between them can be observed.
Germany, as already mentioned, is the 
clearest example of the co-existence of 
the first two wage-setting systems, with its 
dualistic regulatory model separating civil 
servants from the rest of public employ-
ees (and from private sector employees). 
Until the 1990s these legally different 
mechanisms could be considered to some 
extent functionally equivalent, leading to 
similar working conditions despite different 
forms of employment and interest repre-
sentation, thanks to the pattern-setting 
role of negotiations regarding white- and 
blue-collar workers. However, in recent 
times, pressed by the economic crisis and 
budget constraints, government and public 
employers have often used their legally 
guaranteed, unilateral regulatory pow-
ers to significantly change the working 
conditions of civil servants, uncoupling 
bargaining processes and outcomes in 
the two domains (Keller 2011: 2344). 
These developments show that it would 
be misleading to interpret this system as 
de facto negotiations between the state 
and the unions, assimilating it into collec-
tive bargaining, as is at times assumed 
(Glassner 2010): this would overlook the 
fact that, in critical circumstances, such a 
regulatory model gives the public employ-
ers a much greater degree of freedom than 
collective bargaining.
A similar co-existence characterises most 
continental European countries, connected 
with groups of employees, especially in 
the public administration sector, with sep-
arate, distinct rules that prevent or limit 
collective bargaining. What is distinctive 
about Germany, however, is the size of 
this group and the fact that such rules 
and restrictions are not limited to spe-
cific functions, as in the majority of other 
market economies, but to the group of 
Beamte as a whole (Keller 2011: 2333). 
Austria is a similar case, with restrictions 
to collective bargaining rights extended to 
an even larger group of public employees 
(EUROFOUND 2008). In Italy, on the con-
trary, groups with limited bargaining rights 
(but public law status) are a minority of 
public employees, as the large majority 
have terms and conditions of employment 
that are regulated via collective negotia-
tions since 1993.
The last two wage-setting systems, as 
mentioned above, co-exist in the UK. Along 
with widely diffused collective bargaining 
practices, the proportion of employees 
covered by pay review bodies, whose chair 
and members are appointed by the govern-
ment, has been increasing steadily, now 
including more than two million employ-
ees, which is around or above 35 % of total 
public employment. There are currently six 
such bodies covering armed forces, doctors 
and dentists, the National Health Service, 
prison officers, school teachers, and sen-
ior salaries (high level holders of judicial 
offices, senior civil servants, senior offic-
ers of the armed forces, and top senior 
officers of the NHS); police officers have 
partially distinct advisory and negotiating 
boards (www.ome.uk.com). This system 
differs both from unilateral regulation 
and collective bargaining in that wages 
and salaries are directly determined by 
neither the government nor the employ-
ers, nor collectively negotiated by the inter-
ested parties (Bordogna and Winchester 
2001). Rather, these bodies make annual 
recommendations to the government and 
relevant authorities (of England, Scotland 
and Wales) about pay increases based 
on independent research and evidence 
received from both the employers and rep-
resentative organisations of the employees 
and other interested parties. Although in 
most cases the government accepts the 
recommendations of the pay review bod-
ies, in particular circumstances it can use 
its nominal power to reject or amend them, 
as it did in 2009. It may happens that on 
such occasions trade unions, interpreting 
the system as a form of unilateral regula-
tion, accuse the government of imposing 
a ‘diktat’, jeopardising the independence of 
the review bodies, as in 2011 and 2012.
France is an example of contamination 
between the first two systems. Legislation 
dating from 1983 introduced a right to 
limited forms of collective negotiations 
(colloques préliminaires, négociations pré-
alables) concerning pay issues for all public 
functionaries. The government, however, 
retains the ultimate power to unilaterally 
determine pay increases, not only in the 
sense that the outcomes of these nego-
tiations need to be formally approved by 
the government or the parliament, but pri-
marily in the sense that the outcomes are 
not binding for the government, which is 
not obliged to even open the negotiations, 
let alone to reach an agreement, as has 
been the case for possibly the majority of 
years since 1983. This ultimate decisional 
power of the government has not been 
removed even after the important reform 
relating to the renewal of social dialogue 
in the public sector, approved in July 2010. 
Nevertheless, the prerogatives of social 
dialogue have to some extent been 
strengthened and the scope of negotia-
tions has been enlarged to several issues 
other than pay (Bordogna and Neri 2011; 
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EUROFOUND 2010). Given these charac-
teristics, France is certainly closer to the 
model of unilateral determination than 
to a model where the right to collective 
bargaining is fully established, although 
forms of joint regulation are not excluded.
Against this background, a clearly observ-
able trend in recent years, under pressure 
from the economic crisis, is a strong and 
widespread revival of unilateralism, even 
in countries where collective bargaining 
rights and practices are well established. 
Austerity packages affecting public sector 
salaries, employment levels and pension 
systems have been adopted by many gov-
ernments without negotiations, and often 
not even consultation with trade unions 
(for more details, see Chapters 4 and 6 of this 
report. See also Vaughan-Whitehead 2012; 
and European Commission 2011: Ch. 3). 
In addition to employment, salaries and 
pensions, the tradition of free collective 
bargaining or of a broader social dialogue, 
where it has existed, has also been a vic-
tim of governments’ policies in response 
to the crisis.
Box 3.1 Comparing the influence of public-private sector pay  
on the procurement of local government services
Based on a draft by Damian Grimshaw and Jill Rubery (Manchester Business School).
Understanding pay patterns among workers in the public and private sectors is important in the analysis of factors influencing 
procurement decisions. However, direct comparison of pay for similar occupational groups is only one part of the analysis. 
Other factors include: coverage of collective bargaining (which may be uniform across public and private sectors or divided); 
the level of the statutory minimum wage (especially for services that involve low-wage workers); and segmentation in the legal 
employment status of workers (varying for example with the public, private and joint ownership character of the organisa-
tion). We consider these inter-related issues drawing on case studies of municipalities undertaken for an EU-financed project 
involving experts from five countries who have produced five national reports listed in the references (1).
A meta-analysis of the results of a sample of decomposition studies comparing public and private sector pay reveals signifi-
cant inter-country differences in public-private pay patterns. The results suggest a public sector pay premium at the median 
wage for men and women in France and the UK and for women only in Germany, but a public sector pay penalty in Hungary 
and Sweden. Of particular interest is evidence of pay gaps among the lower paid (Table 3.10). Quantile regression studies 
suggest those countries with public sector pay premiums at the median experience even higher premiums among the lower 
paid, especially for women (although for female part-timers in the UK the public sector premium increases with the level 
of pay). In Sweden, the size of the wage penalty among public sector workers is fairly consistent along the pay distribution, 
while in Hungary both sectors tend to pay the minimum wage at the bottom (possibly with a higher incidence of minimum 
wage workers in the public sector) and there are large pay penalties for professional groups.
Evidence from local government case studies in France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden and the UK tests the extent to which this 
portrayal of pay gaps is a realistic reflection of the experiences of procurement. The evidence is mixed (Table 3.10).
(1) Project reference VS/2011/0141, ‘Public sector pay and social dialogue during the fiscal crisis: the effects of pay reforms and procurement strategies on 
wage and employment inequalities’, coordinated by Damian Grimshaw.
Table 3.10: Comparing decomposition results with case-study evidence on the public sector pay premium
Summary results of decomposition studies Local government case-study evidence
Public sector pay 
premium at the 
median wage?
Larger premium for 
the lower paid?
Private sector 
contractors offer 
lower pay?
Worse private 
sector pay a cause 
of union resistance 
to outsourcing?
France Yes Yes (larger for women) No
No (some examples of 
resistance to insourcing)
Germany Yes for women only
Yes (large for women, small 
for men)
Yes (although the gap 
has reduced)
Yes
Hungary
No (penalty since 2007, but 
premium during 2002–6)
No (higher low pay 
incidence in public sector)
No No
Sweden No
No (similar sized penalty at 
all wage levels)
No No
UK Yes Yes (larger for women) Yes Yes
Source: Grimshaw et al. (2012).
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In France, the case studies in fact paint a picture of better conditions among private contractors than in local government and 
reluctance among employees to move back into local government despite some political initiatives within municipalities to 
insource services. Nevertheless, the picture is complicated by the presence of varying public-private organisational forms and 
differences in public and private employment law. An example of outsourced school catering records better pay prospects for 
the catering workers in a public-private organisation (with majority public ownership) than in the municipality, and thus limited 
trade union support for proposals to re-internalise services. By contrast, an example of in-house waste services finds low pay 
and a compressed seniority-related pay-scale, but with some trade-offs with working hours and work effort. The situation 
is further complicated by penalties associated with the re-municipalisation of services and workers: insourced workers lose 
private sector fringe benefits (such as healthcare and other benefits negotiated by the works council of the private sector 
company), and they lose at least half their accumulated seniority entitlements, meaning they miss out on seniority-related 
pay rises until their experience in the municipality has caught up with their protected position in the payscale. These factors 
help explain the reluctance of workers (and unions) in target private sector companies in some of the case study examples 
to agree to proposed insourcing.
In Germany, the case studies generally accord with the pattern of public-private sector pay differences, with lower pay offered 
by private sector providers of local government services. However, the pattern is changing rapidly following the introduction 
of a new low pay grade (grade 1) in the national collective agreement for federal and municipal workers designed explicitly 
to reduce cost incentives to outsource. When combined with the introduction of a patchwork of sector minimum wages, these 
institutional changes have weakened the strength of pay differences as a driver for procurement decisions. Four new binding 
sector minimum wages are especially relevant to local government— those set in the sectors of elderly care, commercial 
cleaning, waste services and temporary agencies.
In West Germany, the public-private gap in minimum pay is now very limited for cleaning and care services, slightly wider for 
waste services (at 54 cents per hour) but of a significant size for temporary agency workers (around €1.50). In East Germany, 
there is much wider differential for cleaning and care services, a narrow gap in waste services (caused by a unified base rate 
for East and West Germany in the collective agreement) and a very wide public-private gap for temporary agency workers. 
The negligible pay differential for provision of cleaning services in West Germany is one reason why some municipalities 
have taken cleaning activities back in-house, although under alternative mixes of public-private ownership; both case-study 
examples involved the hiring of cleaners on grade 1. The picture for waste services provision is more complex, since despite 
a lower sector minimum wage in West Germany, the collective agreements in the private sector set much higher wages, 
close to those prevailing in the public sector. This diminishes the cost incentives for procurement involving private sector 
firms covered by the collective agreement, but we do not know the share of waste service workers in the private sector who 
work in firms outside the sector collective agreement, nor what share are paid the statutory minimum wage for the sector. 
The case-study data suggest that companies outside the collective agreement provide less generous bonuses, pensions and 
employment protection. A further dampening pressure on conditions (as well as the low sector minimum wage) derives from 
the very low minimum for temporary agencies, which supply workers in this (and other) sectors.
In Hungary, the pay gaps revealed by the case studies also fit with the results of econometric decomposition studies. The 
financial precariousness of many municipalities has dampened local government pay during the austerity crisis and acts 
as an incentive for employees (and unions) to accept transfers to the private or third sector. In one case study, elderly care 
workers accepted the outsourcing to a church organisation following a period of severe financial problems within the munici-
pality and the revoking of a raft of supplementary wage benefits. However, while basic pay may be higher in private sector 
contractors delivering local government services, overall employment conditions are more vulnerable due to a switch in legal 
employment status from public to private sector. In practice, this means that coverage of the legal system of wage tariffs 
set out in the public sector pay arrangement is replaced by the thin protection associated with the Labour Code, limited to 
application of the two statutory national minimum wages (a standard and skilled minimum wage). In one municipality, the 
perception among interviewees was that everyone was paid the minimum wage regardless of whether they worked for the 
municipality, a municipal-owned company or a private sector or third sector (e.g. church) subcontractor.
Sweden’s relatively inclusive system of industrial relations means that pay differences are not a strong driver of outsourc-
ing and insourcing decisions in local government. With high collective bargaining coverage, strong union membership and 
a convergence of trends in wage setting in both public and private sectors (‘negotiated decentralisation’), outsourcing and 
insourcing decisions are not motivated by differences in pay and industrial relations. Public and private sector collective agree-
ments exist for all five areas of investigated services (public transport, school catering, cleaning, waste services and elderly 
care); moreover, the sector agreements for school catering and cleaning are in fact integrated across public and private sector 
organisations. Also, the minimum annual wage rises in 2012 were very similar across the public and private sector agreements.
In the UK the industrial relations model divided between strong collective bargaining coverage for public sector workers and 
weak coverage for private sector workers means that workers in private sector contractors delivering elderly care, cleaning and 
school catering services are paid at, or only slightly above, the statutory national minimum wage. At first sight the national 
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collective agreement for local government would appear to set a wage that is increasingly competitive with private sector 
companies; a pay freeze and increases in the national minimum wage have combined to shrink the gap with the collectively 
agreed base rate from 9 % to 2 % during 2009–2012.
However, case studies of six UK municipalities reveal evidence of local interventions to improve pay for the lowest paid. These 
respond to varying combinations of political, managerial and union interests to address problems of poverty (particularly by 
introducing a ‘living wage’), improve staff retention and compensate for higher work effort in a reduced workforce following 
downsizing. These interventions conflict with the strongly ideological central government demand for a revision of public 
sector pay to become ‘more market facing’, which would reduce pay among low paid public sector workers. Our evidence 
suggests pay is pushing in two directions— towards reducing local government workers’ pay as a result of a failure of the 
national agreement to win pay rises and yet a widening gap with the private sector for the very lowest paid following local 
level collective agreements. The overall effect on the role of pay differences in influencing procurement of low-wage services 
in UK local government would thus appear to be neutral.
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3.7. Centralisation, 
decentralisation, 
differentiation
As in the private sector, over the last 
two decades public sector collective 
bargaining and wage-setting systems 
in many countries have undergone two 
connected trends, albeit with impor-
tant exceptions and qualifications: 
decentralisation of pay negotiations 
(European Commission 2011: Ch 1), 
and (partial) substitution of automatic, 
collective, seniority-based pay and 
career systems with more selective and 
discretional systems, often based on 
performance or merit criteria, leading 
to differentiation of careers and terms 
and conditions of public employees. In 
several cases these trends represent 
a significant break with a tradition of 
centralisation and nationally uniform 
procedures and terms and conditions. 
Where decentralisation has occurred, 
moreover, an important difference 
from an industrial relations perspec-
tive is whether this process has taken 
place within or outside of a centrally 
coordinated framework (Traxler 1995).
The reasons for these changes differ 
according to country. In some they are 
linked to the federal form of the state 
(Belgium, Germany), in others they are 
linked to processes of administrative 
and institutional decentralisation and 
increased managerial autonomy, con-
nected to the transfer of services and 
tasks to lower levels of government 
or external agencies, as in Austria, 
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Slovenia and the UK.
From an employment relations and 
HRM perspective, the main purpose of 
this has been to achieve flexibility in 
pay and terms of employment, making 
these more responsive to variations in 
local/sectoral labour market conditions 
and organizational needs. An additional 
reason, strongly stressed in the NPM 
approach and inspired by moral hazard 
theory, has been to reduce opportunis-
tic behaviour within public organisations 
by making agents more responsive and 
responsible to their principal and more 
exposed to the potential costs of their 
actions. Selective pay systems, such as 
performance-related pay, are expected 
to transfer the costs of hypothetical 
opportunistic behaviour at least partially 
onto the individual employee, through the 
denial of pay increases or promotions 
that were previously granted automati-
cally. A similar effect is expected in the 
case of decentralisation of pay bargain-
ing, by linking the level where collective 
negotiations take place and resources are 
distributed more closely to the level where 
resources are ideally produced.
Theory and international comparison sug-
gest however that the expected beneficial 
effects of decentralisation of bargaining 
and differentiation/individualisation of pay 
cannot be taken for granted but depend 
on appropriate institutional conditions. If 
these are absent, as it is often the case in 
public services and public sector employ-
ment relations, unintended and even per-
verse effects may follow. For example, the 
gains in terms of agency costs may be 
offset by the rise in transaction costs; col-
lusive behaviours between the decentral-
ized bargaining parties may occur instead 
than more responsible strategies (Rexed 
et al. 2007; Bordogna 2008).
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These considerations apart, the conse-
quences of the recent economic crisis 
and government austerity packages on 
such trends are not univocal. In gen-
eral, the effects appear to be greater on 
decentralisation processes than on the 
differentiation/individualisation of pay 
and career systems. In various cases, 
bargaining decentralisation has been 
halted or even reversed.
The second trend, on the contrary, has 
apparently been strengthened in sev-
eral countries, along with the adop-
tion of more private-sector-style HRM 
practices, although it has been to some 
extent hampered by the scarcity of 
resources. In both cases, a stronger 
recourse to unilateralism on the part of 
public employers has been instrumental 
in these changes. Significant differences 
are, however, observable across coun-
tries, depending on the gravity of govern-
ments’ financial difficulties but also on 
the appropriateness of the institutional 
arrangements under which decentrali-
sation and differentiation were previ-
ously pursued. Comparisons of public 
and private sector pay practices should 
also take into account qualification lev-
els, which tend to be higher in the public 
sector (IFO 2004).
The Nordic countries are examples of 
coordinated decentralisation, with a 
two-tier collective bargaining system 
in state and regional/municipal sectors, 
where the main public service unions 
form cartels to negotiate with a central-
ised bargaining agent on the employers’ 
side (Ibsen et al. 2011). This two-tier 
structure allows a certain percentage 
of wage increases to be decentralised 
to local bargaining, with coordinating 
mechanisms that differ from country to 
country but are rather effective in all, 
including the possibility of partial alloca-
tions on the basis of merit, qualifications, 
results and responsibilities and therefore 
differentiation on an individual or group 
basis. In Denmark, these changes were 
linked to a major public sector reform 
in 2007 which merged 13 counties and 
271 municipalities into five regions and 
98 municipalities, enlarging the coverage 
of both the municipal and state agree-
ment areas. A strong role of coordina-
tion is played by the Ministry of Finance, 
which controls the budgets of state and 
regions/municipalities and conducts col-
lective bargaining in the state sector. In 
addition, in Denmark wage developments 
in the public sector are linked to develop-
ments in the private sector.
In Norway the process of coordinated 
decentralisation took place within a 
framework of structural devolution 
to agencies that started in the 1980s, 
accompanied by the creation of large 
state-owned companies in various 
services and by a system of manage-
ment by objectives centrally monitored 
through strict budget allocations both 
in the state and municipal sectors. A 
regional reform to merge counties into 
larger regional units has also recently 
been implemented in Norway, although 
more modest compared to the Danish 
example. Since the 1990s the main 
agreements of the state, county and 
municipality sectors allow the distribu-
tion of wage supplements at the local 
level of bargaining, to align structural 
devolution of responsibility with mana-
gerial tools of personnel management, 
although this autonomy may be curbed 
by budgetary constraints and centralised 
controls. Differentiation/individualisa-
tion of pay has also increased in recent 
years in both the state and municipal 
sectors, partly breaking with the high 
uniformity of the past, although in this 
case as well within limits imposed by 
budget constraints.
Through three waves of reform inspired 
by the NPM approach— based on effi-
ciency gains, privatisations and free con-
sumers’ choice— Sweden has the most 
decentralised wage bargaining system. 
In some respects it is even more decen-
tralised than in the private sector, with 
significant possibilities for individualised 
remuneration systems and lighter central 
controls than in Denmark and Norway. 
Despite this, sectoral agreements still 
play a coordinating role, albeit weakened, 
and mechanisms exist to align local level 
responsibilities with local autonomy 
(Ibsen et al. 2011).
Cases of coordinated decentralisation, 
although in different forms than in the 
Nordic countries, are also seen in Ireland, 
partly in the Netherlands after 1993, and 
also in the Czech Republic and Spain. 
A 1993 reform in the Netherlands moved 
the determination of pay and working 
conditions of all public sector employees, 
which was previously the central respon-
sibility of the Minister of the Interior, 
to sector-level negotiations between 
employers and employee organisations 
(Steijn and Leisink 2007), meaning a 
shift both from unilateral to joint regula-
tion and from centralised determination 
to decentralised negotiations.
Italy represents a case of decentralisa-
tion within a two-tier bargaining system, 
albeit less coordinated than in other 
countries, following amendments to the 
1993 reform adopted in 1997–98. As 
a consequence, the number of national 
sectoral agreements for non-managerial 
staff has increased from eight to 12. 
More importantly, centralised controls 
on local-level negotiations have been 
significantly weakened and individual 
employers have been allowed to add 
financial resources in local-level pay 
negotiations above the amounts decided 
upon by national agreements. However, 
this process of bargaining decentrali-
sation has occurred without adequate 
mechanisms to align actors’ autonomy 
and responsibilities at local level and in 
particular the financial responsibilities of 
public employers. Such a misalignment 
between autonomy and responsibil-
ity has facilitated collusive rather than 
responsible behaviours of the decen-
tralised bargaining parties, leading in 
the following years to local-level pay 
increases largely exceeding those of the 
private sector in the same period. This in 
turn prompted the re-establishment of 
centralised controls on the part of the 
government over the entire bargaining 
machinery and new amendments in 2009 
(the so-called Brunetta reform) to reduce 
EUEMP12A-1231-01-I01 - Industrial Relations in Europe Report 2012.indb   115 27/06/2013   10:34:21
116
IndustrIal relatIons In europe 2012
the scope and autonomy of local-level 
negotiations and partially re-centralise 
the bargaining structure at national level, 
with the legal obligation to move from 
the previous 12 sectoral bargaining units 
at national level to no more than four.
In Spain also, a trend towards decen-
tralisation took place in the 1990s and 
2000s, in connection with the process 
of greater administrative autonomy 
given to regions and local govern-
ments, in turn giving rise to relatively 
complicated and at times overlapping 
regulations. To partly contrast these 
trends, in 2006 a reform of legislation 
on employee representation and deter-
mination of employment conditions 
in the public administration (LORAP, 
Ley de Órganos de Representaciόn, 
Determinaciόn de las Condiciones de 
Trabajo y Partecipaciόn del Personal al 
Servicio de las Administraciones Públicas, 
approved in 1987 and amended in 1990 
and 1994) was adopted to coordinate 
the regulation of some common issues 
for salaried employees and civil servants 
across the various administration levels 
(state, autonomous communities and 
local entities; EIRO 2011).
A process of decentralisation of the 
determination of employment condi-
tions and, where it was permitted, of 
collective bargaining, took place also 
in many Eastern European countries 
after the end of communist regimes, 
at times in a rather disorganised way. 
In some countries, collective bargaining, 
for the groups of employees for which 
this is permitted, takes place only at 
the company or individual employer 
level. This is due either to the weak-
ness of trade unions (Estonia, Latvia) 
or the lack of employers’ association 
at sectoral level (the Czech Republic), 
or both reasons. In Romania, the wages 
of public employees were until recently 
determined by a large number of rules, 
with significant variations between dif-
ferent parts of the system, giving rise 
to more than 400 wage levels with a 
1:29 ratio between the minimum and 
maximum wage. This complicated and 
dispersed system was reformed by a 
2009 framework law, amended in 2010, 
to harmonise the wage system of pub-
lic sector workers within a compre-
hensive design to restructure public 
sector employment and pay. This new 
legislation, initially agreed upon by 
trade unions, was eventually unilater-
ally imposed by the government (Vasile 
2012: 274–76).
The clearest example of uncoordinated, 
decentralised single-level bargaining 
structure is probably that of the UK cen-
tral government during the period of 
Conservative cabinets between 1979 
and 1996. Here, the highly centralised civil 
service system and civil-service-wide pay 
determination were replaced with around 
90 semi-autonomous executive agencies, 
each with its own wage and grading sys-
tem, and forms of performance-related 
pay. However, this break-up of previously 
unified conditions of employment in 
locally-based systems, aimed at increas-
ing flexibility, had unintended conse-
quences in terms of fragmented career 
pathways, staff transfer problems, and 
rigidities. Under subsequent governments, 
forms of devolution of pay determina-
tion have been maintained to support 
modernisation, albeit embedded within 
coherent national frameworks, in an 
attempt to reduce pay dispersion (Bach 
and Givan 2011). Considering, moreo-
ver, that bargaining decentralisation has 
always been weaker in other parts of the 
public sector and the increased role of 
the pay review bodies, it is probably inap-
propriate to identify the present public 
sector wage-setting system in the UK as 
a case of uncoordinated decentralisation. 
In any case, within this framework, the 
recent economic crisis has favoured, as in 
other countries, forms of recentralisation 
and unilateralism.
France and Germany are traditionally 
credited with the most centralised wage-
setting systems among all the EU-27 
Member States (Bordogna and Winchester 
2001). This is still the case in France, 
whereas recent developments in Germany 
require qualifications.
In France negotiations on wage increases, 
when they take place, are held between 
the representative trade unions and the 
Minister of Public Function, within lim-
its set by the Minister of Finance. One 
bargaining unit covers all the employ-
ees of the three public functions (central 
government, including education; local 
government; and hospitals). When a 
decision is taken by the government to 
increase wages and salaries by a certain 
percentage, whether agreed with trade 
unions or not, this decision affects in a 
uniform way all six million public func-
tionaries. It is hard to find in Europe an 
equally centralised system, either in the 
public or the private sector. The above-
mentioned recent law on the renewal of 
social dialogue in the public sector may 
have effects on the representative trade 
unions which are admitted to negotia-
tions and on the number of matters that 
can be negotiated (Eurofound 2011c), 
but not on the extreme centralisation of 
the system of pay determination. Forms 
of performance-related pay and individu-
alisation of terms and conditions have 
been introduced in recent years, initially 
for functionaries of the higher grades, 
and then partially extended to the lower 
grades. On the whole, however, this 
does not seem so far to have signifi-
cantly altered the traditionally uniform 
HRM practices that characterise French 
public bureaucracy.
The German wage-setting system used 
to be almost as centralised as the French 
system, despite the federal constitutional 
structure of the state. Centralisation was 
granted by a unitary bargaining coali-
tion on the employers’ side covering all 
three levels of government— federal 
level (Bund), federal states (Länder) and 
municipalities—, led by the Ministry of 
the Interior. Thus, in the German case 
also, only one collective agreement cov-
ering a major bargaining unit is used to 
set pay and working conditions for all 
public employees. The substantive com-
ponents of the agreements were usually 
transferred to civil servants by formal 
decisions of the Federal Parliament. Thus, 
despite different forms of employment 
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and interest representation, changes 
to working conditions were basically 
the same for all public employees, civil 
servants included (Keller 2011: 2344). 
Recently, however, two factors have 
partially altered this highly centralised 
structure. First, in 2003 the Bargaining 
Association of German states (TdL) left 
the unitary bargaining coalition and 
started independent negotiations, con-
cluding in 2006 an important separate 
agreement with state-specific arrange-
ments. Second, a break up also occurred 
within the Bargaining Association at the 
state level with the exit of the state of 
Berlin and the state of Hesse, which 
started a form of single employer bar-
gaining. So, in a short period of time, 
changes in horizontal and vertical inte-
gration altered the highly centralised 
bargaining structures that characterised 
the German system, with its uniform and 
standardised employment conditions 
(Keller 2011). It remains to be seen 
whether these developments are isolated 
events or signal more structural trans-
formations. The economic crisis seems to 
reinforce this trend towards a greater dif-
ferentiation. This is also pursued through 
a wider use of the regulatory powers of 
public employers to first unilaterally 
enforce changes in pay and working con-
ditions of civil servants and then attempt 
to extend them via collective bargain-
ing to other public employees. Greater 
decentralisation and differentiation via 
stronger unilateralism seem to be the 
effects of the crisis on German public 
sector employment relations.
Connected to, but analytically distinct 
from, decentralisation trends are pro-
cesses of differentiation and even 
individualisation of pay and terms and 
conditions. This has occurred in most 
countries under programmes of mod-
ernisation of public administrations, 
inspired to a greater or lesser extent 
by the NPM doctrine. However, there is 
great variation across countries with 
regard to the extent to which these 
measures, in the form of performance-
related pay (PRP) or similar mechanisms, 
have been implemented, especially 
among non-managerial staff (Bach and 
Bordogna 2011). They are more dif-
fused among managers and senior civil 
servants, although the incidence of pay 
linked to performance should not be 
emphasised  (4). These trends towards 
the differentiation of terms and condi-
tions have not been halted, in principle, 
by the recent economic crisis; rather, the 
scarcity of resources has often created 
obstacles to their practical implemen-
tation— recent developments linked to 
part of the 2009 reform in Italy is a case 
in point (Pedersini 2010b).
3.8. Industrial conflict 
and settlement 
of disputes
As noted above and introduced in 
Chapter 1 of this report, the right to 
strike is the most problematic issue 
for public sector employees through-
out the EU (Clauwaert and Warneck 
2008: 22-23). Restrictions often apply, 
although with notable variations across 
countries and different groups of public 
employees. In general, central govern-
ment employees (defence, police, mag-
istrates) and career civil servants are 
more frequently subject to limitations, 
if not simply forbidden to take industrial 
action. However, special regulations can 
also be found in various countries for 
other groups of employees, especially 
those providing essential public services 
such as health services, education, and 
transport. In the latter case, restric-
tions usually apply irrespective of the 
public or private nature of the provider 
and of the legal employment status of 
employees; moreover, they have dif-
ferent characteristics depending upon 
whether the right to strike is constitu-
tionally protected (as in Italy, France, 
Spain and Greece) or not.
(4)  According to a OECD study on performance-
based arrangements for senior civil servants 
(including Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Spain and Sweden among other 
OECD countries), this component is never 
higher than 8 %, and in several cases 
significantly lower (OECD 2007: Table 5).
Apart from the armed forces, police 
and the judiciary, severe restrictions or 
explicit prohibition on taking strike action 
in the case of career civil servants exist 
in several countries such as Germany, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and Poland. The 
case of German Beamte is probably the 
clearest example of this, while in Estonia 
and Austria the right to strike is either 
banned or has a very uncertain status 
for all public employees. Contractual 
employees can usually take industrial 
action related to contract renewal, 
although they are often subject to peace 
obligation clauses during the period of 
validity of collective agreements (as in 
Germany, Denmark and other Nordic 
countries, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
and Ireland). Such clauses do not exist 
in countries such as Italy, France, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia, the UK, and, of 
course, in countries where formal col-
lective agreements are excluded for all 
or groups of public employees.
In several countries special rules exist, for 
instance regarding advance notice before 
taking industrial action or the provision of 
minimum services to be guaranteed in 
case of a strike, as in Italy, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia, Lithuania, and Hungary. These 
rules may refer to ‘essential public ser-
vices’ or to services of ‘special pub-
lic interest’, irrespective of the public 
or private nature of the employer and 
the legal status of the employees. The 
Italian legislation, for instance, defines as 
essential public services, irrespective of 
the legal status of the provider, all those 
services which aim to satisfy the consti-
tutionally protected rights of the person 
to life, safety, health, mobility, education, 
and information, to name but a few (law 
146/1990, amended in 2000). A simi-
lar regulation was approved in France 
in 2007. In Hungary, the right to strike was 
curtailed in 2011 by requiring prior agree-
ment between the parties on ‘adequate 
services’ (Hámori and KÖllŏ 2012: 183).
Other special regulations or institutions 
relate to the procedures used to handle 
collective disputes in the public sector. 
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In some countries special conciliation, 
mediation and arbitration procedures 
for the civil service exist, as in Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, 
and Greece (Bordogna 2007). In Norway, 
where not only employees with ordinary 
contracts but also civil servants have 
the right to strike, mediation is always 
compulsory in the state sector and arbi-
tration is compulsory for senior civil ser-
vice (Stokke 2002). In the Netherlands, 
a special Advisory and Arbitration Board 
(Aac) dates from 1994. In Denmark two 
arbitration systems for all public serv-
ants exist, based on different laws: one 
is a disciplinary court for statutory civil 
servants (the Civil Servants’ Disciplinary 
Court), while the other is an industrial 
relations court for staff covered by col-
lective agreements. For contractual staff 
there is, moreover, the Independent Public 
Conciliator, to which social partners can 
take a matter concerning a conflict of 
interest if they are unable to reach an 
agreement (Andersen at al. 1999; Stokke 
2002). In Ireland, a scheme of concilia-
tion and arbitration for the civil service 
was introduced in 1950, with a third 
party dispute resolution institution (the 
Civil Service Arbitration Board) and joint 
councils for conciliation purposes. Such 
formal mechanisms of conflict resolu-
tion for collective disputes do not exist in 
Germany, where mediation agreements 
are concluded by the autonomous social 
partners or by decisions of the courts 
(Keller 1999).
In other countries, such as Malta, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, the 
institutions and mechanisms to handle 
collective disputes are the same in the 
public and private sector.
Within this web of rules, or despite it, over 
the last decades there has been a shift 
of the relative weight of labour disputes 
from the industrial/manufacturing sectors 
towards the (public) services sector (EU 
Commission 2011; EUROFOUND 2010; 
Bordogna and Cella 2002; Shalev 1992). 
In recent years, as a response to the eco-
nomic crisis, this trend has intensified 
in several countries, especially where 
austerity packages have particularly 
hit public employees, although with 
some exceptions, such as many Eastern 
European countries (see also Chapter 4 
of this report). Often, however, workers’ 
protests have occurred in form of mass 
demonstrations, street violence and riots, 
rather than strikes in the strict sense 
(Bordogna 2010).
3.9. Conclusions: 
Identifying 
clusters
From the point of view of public sec-
tor industrial relations, the European 
Union is a ‘mosaic of diversity’. Despite 
some trends towards convergence both 
between countries and between the pub-
lic and private sector within each national 
case, to a greater degree than in the pri-
vate sector employment and industrial 
relations are here deeply rooted in coun-
try-specific legal, normative and institu-
tional traditions that contribute to this 
diversity and make comparison difficult.
However, in summarising the key fea-
tures of public sector industrial relations, 
five main country clusters can be identi-
fied. Some have relatively strong com-
mon features, and are therefore clearly 
identifiable, while in others marked 
diversities exist within the group.
A first, clearly identifiable group is that of 
the Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland and Norway. The main charac-
teristics of this group are: the largest, 
or among the largest (Finland), size of 
public sector employment in the EU-27, 
with a high female presence and a strong 
welfare state; significant harmonisation 
processes between career civil servants 
and employees employed on ordinary 
contracts, although differences do per-
sist in these countries; very high trade 
union density, though declining slightly 
in recent years, and wide collective nego-
tiations practices within a rather decen-
tralised, two-tier bargaining system 
with strong and effective coordination 
mechanisms; and few restrictions on the 
right to strike but special machinery for 
collective dispute resolution. Elements 
of the NPM doctrine have been adopted, 
including forms of performance-related 
pay, but incorporated within public 
administration systems that maintain 
some (neo-) weberian characteristics 
(Pollitt et al. 2007; Ibsen et al. 2011). 
Partial differences relate to the incidence 
of part-time workers (comparatively low 
in Finland), of temporary workers (very 
high in Finland and Sweden), and of 
young workers (ratio with elder workers 
below 1 in Finland and Sweden). From 
an industrial relations point of view, 
Ireland shares some features with this 
group of countries rather than with the 
UK, to which it is often associated. The 
rate of unionisation is quite high, there 
is special machinery for handling col-
lective disputes in the civil service, and 
national ‘tripartite concertation’ has an 
important regulatory role for central gov-
ernment employees, as in Finland. This 
is despite difficulties in recent years and 
the fact that the single level bargain-
ing system is in itself more centralised 
than in the Nordic countries. Ireland has 
a public sector employment share that is 
relatively high but lower than the Nordic 
countries, the UK and the Netherlands. 
The incidence of women, part-time work-
ers and, especially, young employees is 
relatively high, while the presence of 
temporary employees is relatively low. 
The Netherlands also has some features 
in common with this group, although its 
union density rate is notably lower and 
its two-tier collective bargaining system 
is characterised by a weaker degree 
of coordination; other features of the 
Netherlands, however, are probably 
closer to those of the following group.
Germany, France, Austria, and in 
part Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, with a Rechtsstaat tradi-
tion of Napoleonic or Prussian origin, 
have in common a strong component of 
career civil servants, which make up a 
large proportion of central government 
employees, and in France almost all pub-
lic employees. Career civil servants do 
EUEMP12A-1231-01-I01 - Industrial Relations in Europe Report 2012.indb   118 27/06/2013   10:34:21
119
CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC SECTOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN TRANSITION
not have the right to bargain collectively 
(in France and in Belgium this right has 
a weak status), and in Germany, Austria 
and, with some uncertainty, Belgium, 
career civil servants are also excluded 
from the right to strike. This right is 
instead constitutionally protected in 
France without distinction between pri-
vate and public sector employees, as in 
Italy, which creates somewhat common 
regulatory problems.
Germany, Belgium (at least in central 
government) and, to an even greater 
extent, Austria, have a medium-high 
trade union density. Density rates are 
relatively low in France, although nota-
bly higher than in the private sector. 
In Germany the union density rate of 
Beamte is probably higher than that of 
public sector employees under ordinary 
contracts, which have the same bargain-
ing rights as private sector employees. In 
all countries wage determination is rela-
tively centralised, particularly in France 
and Germany, although in Germany 
there have been some decentralising 
trends in recent years. The public sector 
employment share is high in Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands, but 
comparatively low in Germany and 
Austria. The female employment share 
is rather high in all cases (just below 
70 %), although lower than in the Nordic 
countries. Part-time working is wide-
spread in Germany, Austria, Belgium 
and of course the Netherlands, but less 
so in Luxembourg and France. The inci-
dence of temporary workers is high in 
France and Germany, but notably lower 
in Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
The ratio between young and older 
workers is higher than 2 in Luxembourg 
and significantly higher than 1 in the 
other countries, with the partial excep-
tion of Germany, but in most cases has 
been decreasing since 2008. In the 
comparative public administration lit-
erature, these countries have recently 
been included within the ‘neo-weberian 
state’ model (Pollitt et al. 2007).
A third cluster, although with signifi-
cant internal differences, is that of the 
Southern European countries— Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Malta and 
Cyprus. With regard to the employment 
structure, the public sector share is in 
this cluster comparatively medium-low, 
with the partial exception of Malta and, 
to a lesser extent, Greece. The female 
share in public employment is around 
60 % in Italy, Spain and Cyprus, higher 
in Portugal, and notably lower in Greece 
and Malta. The incidence of part-time 
working, where data exist (Italy and 
Spain), at 12–14 % is much lower than 
in all the countries of the previous clus-
ters, while the incidence of temporary 
workers, well above 20 %, is in Spain 
and Portugal the highest of the EU-27 
(along with Finland). It is medium-high in 
Cyprus, and lower in Italy and Greece. The 
ratio between young and older workers in 
Malta is the third highest in the EU-27, 
well above 1 in all the other countries, 
and the lowest by far in Italy, which has 
the oldest age structure in the EU. Trade 
union density is high in Greece (64 %) 
and medium-high in Italy and Portugal 
(45–50 %); data are not available for the 
remaining countries. As for employment 
relations, most of these countries (Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal) used to share 
several features (with France as well), 
such as the special employment status 
of a large part of public employees and 
no or limited scope for collective bargain-
ing rights, especially for civil servants. 
Since the early 1990s, however, Italy has 
moved towards the Nordic countries clus-
ter, although with difficulties and spe-
cificities, adopting several NPM-inspired 
measures, at least the rhetoric of this  (5). 
Special employment status has been 
abolished for the large majority of public 
employees; jurisdiction has moved from 
administrative law and tribunals to pri-
vate law and ordinary courts; collective 
bargaining, with a two-tier structure, has 
become the main method for determin-
ing terms and conditions of employment, 
including pay, and is widely practiced 
with some form of central coordination, 
however ineffective, between 1998 and 
(5)  Kickert (2007) interprets Italy as a case of 
New Public Management failure.
2007. Bargaining coverage, with regard 
to national collective agreements, is 
100 % due to the sole and compulsory 
employers’ representation in ARAN. 
Forms of performance-related pay have 
been introduced since the late 1990s 
especially for managerial positions, 
although subject to weak assessment 
procedures, while they have less impor-
tance for non-managerial employees; the 
effects of the 2009 reform have still to 
be proven. The right to strike is consti-
tutionally protected without distinctions 
between public and private employees, 
with limitations only for employees (both 
private and public) of the essential public 
services. In Greece, where union density 
is relatively high (64 %, more than three 
times higher than in the private sector), 
the right to collective bargaining was 
introduced by legislation in 1999 for civil 
servants, although their public law status 
has not been abolished and pay issues 
are still excluded from negotiations; col-
lective negotiations have greater influ-
ence for contract employees and in local 
government. In Portugal also, the spe-
cial status of a relevant part of public 
employees has not been abolished, and 
although collective negotiations play 
a significant role in determining terms 
and conditions of employment, includ-
ing of career civil servants, if they reach 
a stalemate the government maintains 
the power to act unilaterally. The union 
density rate is around 45 %. The special 
employment status of a significant part 
of public employees, with the connected 
prerogatives, also survives in Spain, 
although, as in Portugal, almost one in 
four public employees has a temporary 
or fixed-term contract. Union density in 
the sector is around 30–31 % (Muñoz de 
Bustillo and Antόn 2012). In both coun-
tries NPM-inspired reforms have been 
introduced to a limited extent, at least 
until recently.
A final group with specific features 
consists of the former communist 
Central and Eastern European coun-
tries— Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
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Romania. All these countries, with the 
partial exception of Hungary, have 
a comparatively small public sector 
employment share with a relatively 
high presence of women, particularly 
in the Baltic countries (around or above 
75 %), with few exceptions (mainly 
Romania). As far as available data 
show, there is a limited incidence of 
part-time and of temporary workers, 
with the partial exception, in the lat-
ter case, of Poland and Hungary. The 
share of young employees is very high 
in Romania, Slovenia and Poland, to a 
lesser extent in Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, but low in the 
Baltic countries and especially Bulgaria. 
No systematic, comparative data on 
unions are available, but trade unions 
are generally weak, with the exception 
of Romania and Slovenia. This is espe-
cially the case in central administra-
tion, where career civil servants with 
special employment status are still 
important and the practice of collective 
bargaining is limited or totally absent, 
either because of formal restrictions 
or because of the weakness of trade 
unions. Where collective negotiations 
exist, they often take place only at the 
individual employer level, in some cases 
also because of the absence of the rel-
evant employers associations, as in the 
Czech Republic. Bargaining coverage 
is consequently very low. Social dia-
logue institutions exist in some coun-
tries, such as Hungary and Romania, 
but their role has been significantly 
restricted in recent years. Restrictions 
exist also with regard to the right to 
strike, especially in central administra-
tion. Overall, this group stands out for 
the weakness of industrial relations 
institutions and practices, with Slovenia 
as probably the main exception. For 
more details on industrial relations in 
the new Member States, see Chapter 2 
of this report.
The UK can perhaps be considered 
a separate case, although some fea-
tures of its employment structure are 
similar to those of other clusters. The 
share of public sector employment is 
comparatively rather high, with a high 
presence of women and part-time 
employees. The percentage of tem-
porary workers, however, is the lowest 
in the EU-27, while the ratio between 
young and older workers, although not 
particularly high, is well above 1. Some 
peculiarities in employment relations 
stand out. For example, there is no 
special status for public employees in 
general and civil servants, no special 
limitations on the right of association 
and the right to strike, with the excep-
tions of a few groups, although since 
the 1980s strike action is subject to 
general, rather strict procedural rules. 
Trade union density is medium-high 
in comparative terms and almost four 
times higher than in the private sec-
tor. Collective negotiations are widely 
practiced, within a single level bargain-
ing system, but a significant propor-
tion of public employees are covered 
by pay review bodies. Negotiations are 
rather decentralised in the civil service, 
although measures to reduce fragmen-
tation and pay dispersion have been 
put into place since the late 1990s. 
Forms of performance-related pay are 
in operation, linked to various waves of 
NPM-inspired reforms adopted since 
the 1980s, but attention is also paid 
to equal pay and low-pay issues. The 
traditional model employer approach 
has been abandoned under the Thatcher 
governments, but employment relations 
in the public sector are still different 
from those in the private sector.
Within this framework, the measures 
adopted by many EU governments in 
response to the global economic cri-
sis that began in 2007 not only have 
affected the employment levels, salaries 
and pension benefits of public employ-
ees (see evidence in Chapter 4 of this 
report), but in some instances have also 
strained the traditional regulatory sys-
tem prevailing in the country. Sometimes 
these strains have halted or reversed 
consolidated patterns; in other cases 
they appear to have accelerated and 
deepened changes already underway. 
Four main problematic features can be 
mentioned here (for an extensive analy-
sis of the impact of the crisis on public 
sector industrial relations, see Chapter 4 
of this report).
First, there has been a general revival 
of unilateralism, with few exceptions. In 
many cases measures affecting public 
employees and public service employ-
ment relations have been decided on 
relatively urgently without negotiations 
with trade unions and sometimes even 
outside consultative procedures. Where 
powers of unilateral determination for-
mally existed, they have of course been 
utilized (France and Germany for Beamte 
are cases in point, but also various cen-
tral and eastern European countries like 
the Baltic countries, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania— see Vaughan-
Whitehead 2012); where collective bar-
gaining or forms of social dialogue were 
allowed and practiced, these have been 
suspended or were less effective (Italy is 
a clear example, Ireland is another one, 
at least in the first phase of the crisis, but 
also the UK, Spain, Portugal, and Greece 
could be mentioned). It should also be 
noted, however, that where the social 
dialogue is not well-embedded in the 
public sector it is much more difficult to 
find consensus, particularly in a difficult 
economic context. For a more detailed 
examination of the tension between the 
role of government and the development 
of social dialogue, see Chapter 4.
Second, we have seen a process of 
recentralisation of wage-setting systems 
in many countries, as a consequence of 
centrally defined horizontal measures 
applied in a generalised and undifferen-
tiated way to all services and all employ-
ees (Italy, France, UK, Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal, some central and eastern 
European countries), although in some 
cases the break-up of centralised sys-
tems has opened the way to processes 
of decentralisation and differentiation of 
procedures and terms and conditions, as 
in Germany.
A third point regards the traditional 
issue of the distinctiveness of public 
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service employment relations com-
pared with the private sector. The 
removal of this feature was a crucial 
target of the NPM approach, within a 
wider programme towards a leaner 
and less distinctive public sector. In 
this respect, recent measures adopted 
in response to the economic crisis seem 
to have had ambivalent effects. On the 
one hand, probably the main distinctive 
feature of public sector employment 
relations, namely the power of public 
employers to unilaterally determine 
the terms and conditions of civil serv-
ants, has been reaffirmed and possibly 
further strengthened, also influencing 
dynamics and outcomes related to 
public employees under private con-
tract (like in Germany). On the other 
hand, these peculiar prerogatives have 
in some cases been used to accelerate 
the introduction into the public sector 
of private-sector-style HRM practices 
and managerial techniques (like in Italy).
The final feature concerns public sec-
tor trade unions. While they remain the 
stronghold of national trade union move-
ments almost everywhere, their role has 
generally been weakened by the crisis, 
at least in terms of capacity to influ-
ence governments’ and public employ-
ers’ policies.
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Appendix
Appendix 3.1 Number employed in public sectors as % of total employed in all activities
Public sectors Public administration Education Health
2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011 2008 2011
EU-27 23.6 24.8 7.1 7.1 7.0 7.3 9.5 10.4
EU-15 24.9 26.3 7.3 7.2 7.0 7.5 10.6 11.6
Belgium 31.0 31.7 9.7 8.9 8.5 9.2 12.8 13.6
Bulgaria 17.8 19.2 7.0 7.6 6.1 6.4 4.7 5.2
Czech Republic 18.4 19.3 6.3 6.5 5.7 6.1 6.4 6.7
Denmark 30.8 33.4 6.0 5.6 7.2 9.0 17.6 18.8
Germany 24.6 25.4 7.2 7.0 6.1 6.2 11.3 12.2
Estonia 19.6 21.8 5.8 6.6 9.1 9.4 4.7 5.8
Ireland 22.3 26.6 5.0 5.7 6.8 7.9 10.5 13.0
Greece 20.4 22.2 8.3 8.8 7.0 7.5 5.1 5.9
Spain 18.2 22.2 6.3 7.8 5.7 6.5 6.2 7.9
France 29.6 29.6 10.3 9.7 6.9 6.7 12.4 13.2
Italy 20.1 20.4 6.2 6.3 6.9 6.7 7.0 7.4
Cyprus 19.2 18.8 8.0 7.1 7.1 7.8 4.1 3.9
Latvia 20.6 21.8 7.7 6.4 8.2 10.4 4.7 5.0
Lithuania 21.7 23.5 5.5 6.1 10.0 10.7 6.2 6.7
Luxembourg 30.2 29.9 11.8 11.8 8.4 8.1 10.0 10.0
Hungary 21.6 22.9 7.1 7.8 8.0 8.3 6.5 6.8
Malta 24.8 26.5 8.8 8.8 8.4 9.3 7.6 8.4
Netherlands 29.3 29.6 6.6 6.5 6.9 6.7 15.8 16.4
Austria 21.3 22.1 6.8 6.6 5.7 6.2 8.8 9.3
Poland 19.1 19.9 6.2 6.6 7.5 7.6 5.4 5.7
Portugal 19.0 21.6 6.6 6.4 6.6 7.6 5.8 7.6
Romania 13.4 13.8 5.0 5.1 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.4
Slovenia 18.8 20.6 5.7 6.3 7.5 8.4 5.6 5.9
Slovakia 19.8 22.0 6.9 8.2 6.7 7.0 6.2 6.8
Finland 26.2 27.9 4.6 4.7 6.5 7.2 15.1 16.0
Sweden 31.8 32.3 5.7 6.0 10.6 10.8 15.5 15.5
United Kingdom 28.5 30.1 7.1 6.3 9.1 10.4 12.3 13.4
Norway 32.7 35.6 5.6 5.7 8.7 8.3 18.4 21.6
Source: Eurostat.
NB: NACE rev.2 classification.
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Appendix 3.2 Employment change in all activities and public sector, 2008–2011
% change
All activities
Total public 
sector
Public 
administration 
Education Health
EU-27 -1.9 2.4 -1.1 1.1 5.9
EU-15 -1.8 2.5 -1.5 1.2 6.0
Belgium 1.9 5.7 0.7 5.5 10.3
Bulgaria -10.3 -5.7 -4.8 -8.8 -3.1
Czech Republic -2.5 -3.1 -6.8 -3.1 0.8
Denmark -4.9 2.5 0.0 13.8 -1.4
Germany 2.0 3.8 -3.7 4.5 8.5
Estonia -8.3 2.7 4.7 -4.8 14.6
Ireland -13.8 2.2 -2.0 -0.5 5.9
Greece -8.6 -2.9 -3.5 -4.3 0.3
Spain -10.3 3.3 4.7 2.1 2.9
France -0.9 0.6 -0.6 -2.5 3.1
Italy -2.0 -1.6 -2.0 -6.6 3.5
Cyprus -0.1 6.3 3.0 11.6 6.6
Latvia -24.0 -11.1 -17.4 -7.2 -9.5
Lithuania -9.8 -3.0 -2.4 -3.8 -2.2
Luxembourg 5.8 13.0 6.7 11.5 18.1
Hungary -1.4 2.4 -4.1 4.1 8.8
Malta 4.2 2.2 -0.8 0.7 7.3
Netherlands -0.4 7.1 3.1 1.6 10.9
Austria 1.8 3.5 0.4 3.4 5.6
Poland 1.9 6.3 8.1 3.8 7.7
Portugal -5.6 3.7 -1.2 1.4 10.4
Romania -3.3 1.2 0.1 -1.8 5.6
Slovenia -5.5 5.5 1.0 8.3 6.7
Slovakia -1.7 -0.1 -2.5 1.8 0.2
Finland -1.6 1.3 -1.9 3.4 2.0
Sweden 0.8 0.6 -2.0 1.8 0.7
United Kingdom -0.8 3.9 -5.4 3.7 8.5
Norway -0.5 4.7 3.4 4.8 5.2
Source: Eurostat, National Accounts and Labour Force Survey.
NB: All figures come from the National Accounts except as noted here. For Bulgaria and Romania, data for public sector activities come 
from LFS; for Portugal, the change 2010–2011 is estimated from LFS data; for the UK, data for Public administration and Education relate 
to the number of jobs rather than number of persons employed; data for Health come from the LFS. The EU totals are based on the sum 
of employment in Member States in the different sectors. ‘Total public sector’ is the sum of employment in the three sectors shown.
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